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IN DEFENSE OF IMPLIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

John F. Preis*

ABSTRACT
If Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited a suit to enforce the Constitution,
may the federal courts create one nonetheless? At present, the answer mostly turns on
the form of relief sought: if the plaintiff seeks damages, the Supreme Court will normally refuse relief unless Congress has specifically authorized it; in contrast, if the
plaintiff seeks an injunction, the Court will refuse relief only if Congress has specifically barred it. These contradictory approaches naturally invite arguments for reform.
Two common arguments—one based on the historical relationship between law and
equity and the other based on separation of powers principles—could quite foreseeably
combine to end implied injunctive relief as we know it.
In this Article, I defend the federal courts’ power to issue injunctions in constitutional cases without explicit congressional authorization—a practice known as
“implying” a suit for relief. The defense rests on two proofs, both largely historical.
First, I show that the historical relationship between law and equity has largely been
misunderstood in the realm of injunctive relief. Second, I show that implied injunctive
relief does not contravene separation of powers principles because Congress and the
federal courts have, since the Founding, viewed implied injunctive relief as permissible
and even appropriate. These proofs do not account for policy concerns that might impact the inquiry, but they do suggest that such concerns must be extraordinarily compelling to overcome the federal courts’ centuries-old power to imply injunctive relief
in constitutional cases.
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INTRODUCTION
It is one thing to have a constitution, but it is quite another to enforce it. What is
needed is some mechanism to make rights written on paper—what James Madison
called mere “parchment barriers”—come alive in the lives of individual persons.1 In
the United States, one of the most prominent enforcement tools is the civil rights action,
an action brought by the victim of a constitutional violation against the perpetrator. In
such actions, the Constitution is made real through either damages or injunctive relief.
Who is in charge of civil rights actions? Congress, mostly. Congress has the power
to create or abolish civil rights actions, and barring narrow exceptions, the federal
courts are obliged to follow such choices.2 In regulating these actions, Congress does
not create or abolish the constitutional rights themselves, of course; it merely defines
the avenues through which the rights shall be enforceable. If a plaintiff wants to know
the remedies available for a constitutional violation, therefore, the best place to look
is in the U.S. Code.
The U.S. Code is the best place to look, but it is not the only place. If the statute
books do not create or prohibit a suit for relief, plaintiffs frequently turn to the federal
1

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 424 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See, e.g., Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1938) (holding that
Congress may bar the federal courts from enjoining labor strikes, even where a case presents
a constitutional issue). The federal courts need not follow a congressional bar on civil rights
actions if such actions are needed to “maintain[ ] a regime of lawful government.” Daniel J.
Meltzer & Richard H. Fallon, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779 (1991). While less than ideal, such a regime can tolerate “the
denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress.” Id.
2
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courts for assistance. Plaintiffs in these circumstances will ask the courts to create—or
“imply”—a civil rights action on their own. At present, the availability of implied actions depends, strangely enough, on whether the relief sought is monetary or injunctive.
Suits for monetary relief are typically difficult to obtain from the courts. In the Supreme
Court’s view, creating an action for damages is a legislative task, not a judicial one.3
Justice Scalia put it most memorably in a frequently quoted 2001 concurrence, stating
that the implied damages action is “a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’
by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”4
Suits for injunctive relief, in contrast, are much easier to obtain. In the absence of
congressional direction, the Court is typically comfortable “assum[ing] common-law
powers” to create such actions. Instead of demanding congressional authorization, the
Court simply asks the “straightforward” question “whether [the] complaint alleges
an ongoing violation of federal law.”5 If such a violation exists, and Congress has not
affirmatively barred the action, then a suit for injunctive relief will be available.
This incongruous approach to implied constitutional actions has naturally given
rise to arguments for change. One group of scholars has argued the Court’s stingy
approach to damages ignores the historic relationship between law and equity. For
hundreds of years, the argument goes, damages have been considered the “ordinary”
remedy for a violation of law while injunctive relief has been considered a “drastic
and extraordinary” remedy.6 This historic relationship, which has never been affirmatively disclaimed, suggests that damages should be at least as available as injunctions,
if not more. To arrange the doctrine differently “gets the traditional interplay between
law and equity exactly backwards.”7 If the Court is to respect history, therefore, it
should dramatically increase the availability of implied constitutional damages.
3

See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1983); see also Alex Reinert & Lumen
N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens after Minneci, 90 WASH. UNIV.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8–11), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract
=2042175 (explaining the separation of powers concerns underlying the Court’s implied
damages jurisprudence).
4
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia recently repeated his view in the 2011 term. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617,
626 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5
Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010) (“An injunction is
a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course.”); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) (“Historically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”).
7
Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1117, 1135 (1989); see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 301 (1995) (arguing that the “most damning argument”
against the Court’s stingy damages jurisprudence is how it “perverts the usual treatment of
damages”); Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional
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This is one response to the incongruity, but there is another. Instead of making
damages actions more available, the Court could instead withdraw the easy availability of injunctive actions, thus making them harder to obtain than damages actions.
This response would not only pay heed to the historical relationship between the two
actions, but it would also pay heed to separation of powers principles—principles
that have long animated implied damages actions but which, inexplicably, have been
absent from implied equitable actions.8
There is good reason to think the Court might ultimately choose this latter path.
Just last term, the Court heard an important case involving implied injunctive relief.
In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California,9 a plaintiff asked the
Court to imply an injunctive action under the Supremacy Clause.10 The Court found a
way to duck the issue,11 but Chief Justice Roberts dissented for himself and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. The dissenters would have rejected the plaintiff’s request because Congress had not authorized such an action and for the Court to do so on its own
“would raise the most serious concerns regarding . . . the separation of powers . . . .”12
Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 713–15 (2009) (arguing that the
Court’s approach to damages “invert[s] the traditional understanding of equity” and that the
Court’s “inflexible dichotomy between prospective and retrospective . . . constitutional suits
[cannot] be justified”); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1542–43 (1972) (“If a federal court acting under a general
grant of jurisdiction may appropriately give equitable relief based upon the Constitution, there
is no readily apparent reason why the same court would not have similar power to grant a remedy
at law in cases in which such a remedy might be appropriate for the effectuation of a constitutional guarantee.”); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 578 (1986)
(“Furthermore, if the defendant might, in theory, be enjoined from violating the legislation,
what reason could be given for denying the plaintiff the less intrusive remedy of damages?”).
8
Professor Richard Fallon recently noted the absence of separation of powers concerns
in the Court’s implied injunction jurisprudence:
The Court . . . has treated suits for injunctions against ongoing constitutional violations strikingly differently from [constitutional damages]
actions. In cutting back on [damages actions], the Court has said that the
decision whether to authorize damages remedies for constitutional violations is more appropriately made by Congress than the courts and that
judges should be wary of recognizing “implied” causes of action. By
contrast, the post-Brown Court, so far as I am aware, has never suggested
that injunctions against ongoing constitutional violations are constitutionally problematic in the way it now believes [damages] actions to be.
Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1113 (2011).
9
132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
10
Id. at 1208–09.
11
After oral argument but before an opinion had been issued, a federal agency changed its
view of the applicable law, thus substantially altering the question presented. A five-justice
majority thus remanded the case to the lower courts for consideration of the new question
presented. See id. at 1208.
12
Id. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Though Roberts’s position only commanded four votes, there is good reason to believe
that a fifth vote is well within reach.13
To be sure, Roberts’s dissent in Douglas is narrow. It stops short of sweeping away
all implied injunctive relief in constitutional cases, preferring instead to focus only on
Supremacy Clause claims. The dissent does, however, highlight the potential force of
separation of powers logic in this field.14 As Professor Stephen Vladeck has argued,
“Taken to its logical extreme, the Chief[ ] [Justice’s] reasoning might even extend
to suits for injunctive relief to enforce specific constitutional provisions (such as the
Fourth Amendment),” rather than simply Supremacy Clause cases.15
Thus, if the Court truly cares about the historical relationship between law and
equity, and truly cares about deferring to congressional prerogatives, it may not be
long before implied injunctive relief is no longer available in constitutional cases.
In this Article, I explain why this reasoning is flawed and why the federal courts
have the power to imply injunctive relief in constitutional cases. I do so by tracing
the remedy’s long development from fifteenth-century England to twentieth-century
America. This development shows that: (1) the availability of implied monetary relief
and the availability of implied injunctive relief have not been tightly bound together in
any particular relationship and (2) federal courts having jurisdiction over a dispute have,
from the Founding, enjoyed the power to create injunctive actions without explicit
authorization from Congress. Together, these points rebut any suggestion that implied
injunctive relief should be curtailed on historical and separation of powers grounds.
This defense of implied injunctive relief is valuable for two important reasons.
First, much of the current scholarship on the availability of injunctive relief in constitutional enforcement focuses not on the history of equity, but on the costs and benefits of injunctive relief.16 This is valuable work, but the Court cares deeply about history
in this field, having repeatedly defined its equitable powers as equal to those of the
“High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”17
13

Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
13, 14 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/30/vladeck.html (arguing that, because
“Justice Kennedy . . . had . . . argued for an analogous result in [a prior case], there may
already be five votes” in favor of Chief Justice Roberts’s view).
14
See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
15
See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 17.
16
See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (arguing that “limitations on damages, together with modern expansions
of injunctive relief . . . [create] a rolling redistribution of wealth from older to younger, as the
societal investment in constitutional law is channeled toward future progress and away from
backward looking relief”). See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional
Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) (arguing that, in certain
contexts, damages are preferable to injunctions in constitutional enforcement because high
transaction costs prevent efficient equitable remedies).
17
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)
(“[E]quity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution . . . .”); see also,

6
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Second, the defense contributes new authority to the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of “constitutional common law,” a species of law that includes “remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by . . . various constitutional provisions.”18 Scholars have long debated whether such judicial lawmaking
(implied constitutional actions being merely one example) is permissible and this
Article provides significant evidence that the Founding Generation would have seen
implied injunctive relief as legitimate.19
The Article proceeds chronologically in three steps. Part I begins in England hundreds of years before America was founded. It traces legal and equitable actions from
their founding to the eighteenth century and shows that the two actions were not closely
tied together in any particular relationship. The Article then turns to America in Part II.
That Part shows how equity’s detachment from the law was carried over to America,
both by congressional edict and judicial practice. Untethered from legal actions, federal equitable actions thus grew into powerful tools of constitutional enforcement during the late nineteenth century and largely remain with us today. Part III then addresses
the modern era. This was an era of statute, and the survival of implied injunctive relief thus turned on whether Congress’s legislative directives explicitly or implicitly
deprived the courts of their power to issue the remedy. None of the major legislation
during this era accomplished this deprivation20 and the authority to create injunctive
actions thus remains intact today.
e.g., Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935). There are two articles that do look
at the issue historically. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89
IOWA L. REV. 777 (2004) (discussing judicial implied relief in England and early America);
John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008) (discussing the federal courts’
exercise of equitable jurisdiction in the early twentieth century). Both articles are important, but
neither focuses specifically on English equity in the eighteenth century or American equity in
the nineteenth century—both of which are foundational to the federal courts’ modern approach
to implied injunctive relief.
18
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975).
19
See generally RICHARD FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (describing
and defending the judicial creation of doctrinal tools used to implement constitutional norms);
Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 134 (1985) (arguing that federal courts have no authority to “impose implementing ‘details’ that are not constitutionally required”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (providing a framework for
determining when federal courts may exercise a law-making function); Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479
(2010) (arguing that constitutional concerns are pervasive in administrative law and the
resulting doctrine is a type of constitutional common law); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C.
Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1138–40
(1978) (challenging the legitimacy of constitutional common law).
20
See infra Part III.
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Although the past exerts immense power over the Court’s current approach to
implied injunctive relief, policy concerns should not be ignored. These concerns—
ranging from democratic accountability21 to economic efficiency22—could conceivably militate against implying injunctive relief. I do not consider those arguments here.
Instead, I merely argue that if the Court intends to pay heed to the historical roots of
its power—as it so often professes to do in this field—the case for a judicial power
to enjoin unconstitutional conduct is extraordinarily strong.
I. LAW AND EQUITY IN ENGLAND
The fate of implied injunctive relief today depends in large part on the past. Not
only do arguments for reform depend on the historical relationship between law and
equity, but the Supreme Court itself has declared over and over again that the “equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”23 It
is essential, therefore, to understand the origins and growth of English equity.
This Part takes on that task. It describes how legal and equitable causes of action
came to exist and, in particular, how equity regarded the common law. This discussion yields two central insights. First, the existence of an equitable cause of action was
not necessarily dependent on a legal cause of action.24 Courts of equity had the authority
to, and did in fact, create causes of action in cases where courts of law would not issue
damages. This suggests that the two causes sometimes lived separate lives and that we
should be hesitant to yoke the two remedies together. Second, although courts of equity
professed a willingness to adhere to common law rights and defer to legal remedies, this
deference was narrowly practiced and effectively uncheckable.25 Equitable remedies
thus issued as a matter of course in several categories of cases, making them far less
“extraordinary” than typically believed.
A. Law
It is often best to start at the very beginning. In the realm of English adjudication,
the very beginning is 1066, the year of the Norman Conquest. Before that time, disputes
in what was to become England were resolved primarily through a crude system of
21

See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that judicial lawmaking is unwise in part because it is democratically illegitimate).
22
See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 16, at 823–24 (arguing that damages will be more
efficient than injunctive relief in certain circumstances).
23
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999); see
also, e.g., Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935).
24
See infra Part I.B.1.
25
See infra Part I.B.2.
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“communal justice.”26 Justice was had, or not, at the hands of a “folk-assembly” gathered at the local village or manor.27 Disputants might be persuaded by their neighbors
to give up their differences, or the crowd might appeal to supernatural authority for
intervention.28 If the gathering failed to yield a resolution, the parties would be left to
muddle on. After the Norman Conquest, however, an alternative avenue of resolution
presented itself: a direct appeal to the king.
Take, for example, a dispute from the year 1114. In that year, Richard, the Abbot
of York, was at odds with a man by the name of Geoffrey de Spineto.29 Mr. Spineto
had been fishing in the lake of Hornsea, a lake the monastery claimed it had received
as an estate gift years earlier.30 Apparently having no luck with local resolution, the
Abbot appealed to King Henry I for assistance.31 The Abbot explained the situation
to the King, who then resolved the matter by issuing a “writ.”32 A writ was simply a
letter from the crown ordering that some act be taken.33 In the Abbot’s case, the writ
decreed that “Richard abbot of York shall hold freely the [lake] of Hornsea.”34
By the twelfth century, “knights and abbots [were] constantly rushing to the king,
trying to obtain a writ of prompt redress for some alleged wrong.”35 The process became so common that the king handed the process off to his close assistant, the lord
chancellor.36 The chancellor in turn began to issue writs to local officials, each writ describing the “steps to be taken to determine a controversy or secure a right.”37 There
was no formal law at this point. Local officials simply resolved disputes according to
the instructions in the writ, as well as general notions of what was “right,” according to
“reason, religion, [and] morals as well as . . . established and unmistakable custom.”38
As the centuries passed, certain types of disputes occurred routinely enough that
the chancellor stopped issuing distinct writs for each case. Instead, Chancery (the office
26

J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 4 (1979).
Id.
28
Id. at 4–5.
29
See William Farrer, An Outline Itinerary of Henry I, 34 ENG. HIST. REV. 303, 370 (1914).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 179 (1936).
34
Farrer, supra note 29, at 370.
35
R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL
241 (1959).
36
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV.
429, 441 (2003).
37
RADIN, supra note 33, at 179; see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW 22 (1969) (explaining that free tenants could go to royal court to obtain
a writ “directing the lord to do right to them”).
38
RADIN, supra note 33, at 181. Often, the writ would simply order the judge to “do
right” by the injured party. See MILSOM, supra note 37, at 22; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 35,
at 486 (“I order you to do full right to the abbot of Abington, in respect of his sluice which, the
men of Stanton have broken.”).
27
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of the chancellor) created a variety of standardized writs.39 Each writ contained a
“complete set of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law, determining who has to
do what to obtain the unique remedy the writ specifies for particular circumstances.”40
For example, if a person suffered a punch in the face, he would likely pursue the standardized writ of trespass vi et armis.41 That writ promised a plaintiff damages, but only
if the plaintiff presented the evidence listed in the writ, and did so in the manner defined by the writ.42
Taken together, the collection of writs enforceable in English courts of law comprised the common law. Lawyers and jurists, however, did not think of the law in the
categorical terms we do today. There was no such thing as “tort law,” for example;
there was only a set of writs that addressed interference with the person.43 Nor was
there a general law of “civil procedure,” for each writ came with its own “mini civil
procedure system.”44 The same went for rules of evidence as well as remedies.45
If a writ was applicable to a plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff was said to have a “cause
of action.”46 Thus, a person who suffered a punch in the face was said to have a “cause
of action for trespass vi et armis.”47 Our modern ears have become numbed to the
phrase “cause of action,” but if it is studied for a moment, the phrase is actually quite
descriptive. To say that a victim of physical abuse had a “cause of action” in eighteenthcentury England was to say that the plaintiff had sufficient “cause” for taking some
“action” in court. His lawsuit was justified because a preexisting writ permitted him
39

Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV.
10, 10–11 (1926) (“An action was begun by the issuance of a writ appropriate to the form of
action; in time these writs became standardized.”); VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 35, at 178.
40
H. Brent McKnight, How Then Shall We Reason, The Historical Setting of Equity, 45
MERCER L. REV. 919, 929 (1994).
41
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 103–04 (2009) (explaining that this type of writ was
obtained for a wrong committed “with force and arms”).
42
Id.
43
BAKER, supra note 26, at 49 (“There was a law of writs before there was a law of
property, or of contract, or of tort.”); see also PAUL BRAND, THE MAKING OF THE COMMON
LAW 96–97 (1992) (“The use of standard forms of writ . . . helped to point judges and lawyers in the direction of conceptualizing English law in terms of a series of discrete forms of
action, each corresponding to one particular type of writ, each offering a particular type of
remedy for particular constellations of factual circumstance . . . .”).
44
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 96.
45
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 915 (1987) (“Distinct procedural
characteristics developed for different writs. Each writ implied a wide range of procedural,
remedial, and evidentiary incidents, such as subject matter and personal jurisdiction, burden
of proof, and methods of execution.”).
46
Id. at 935 (“The term ‘cause of action’ was at least as old as the fifteenth century. Like
the forms of action under the writ system, the term implied a set of circumstances for which
there was a known remedy.”).
47
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 103–04.
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an avenue for a specific type of relief.48 We are in the habit today of separating the
cause of action from substantive right, procedure, and remedy, but that was not the
practice in England. Right, procedure, and remedy were all wrapped into one—together
called the “writ.” If the events giving rise to a plaintiff’s injury were described in the
writ, the plaintiff was able to prove them in the manner specified by the writ, and the
plaintiff desired the remedy dictated by the writ, the plaintiff had a cause of action. If
the plaintiff’s case could not be fit within a writ, he was out of luck because commonlaw judges had little power to modify writs to fit new circumstances.49
B. Equity
Although the common-law courts were a vast improvement over the “communal
justice” system that existed before 1066, the courts still drew criticism. Writs did not
cover every injustice and, by the fourteenth century, Chancery had stopped issuing
new writs.50 Moreover, even when a writ applied, its “precise and technical rules”
might put relief beyond reach.51 Dissatisfaction with the courts led prospective litigants
to skip the courts and appeal directly to the king for relief.52 The king, of course, was
not confined by the terms of any writ.53 He was free to issue whatever order he desired,
just as he had originally done soon after the Norman invasion.54 In the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, as more and more plaintiffs bypassed the common-law courts and
came to him directly for relief, the king began (again) referring the disputes to the lord
chancellor.55 Instead of issuing a new writ to address the plaintiffs’ claims, the chancellor began to resolve the disputes on his own.56
48
BRAND, supra note 43, at 96 (“[L]itigants were allowed to initiate litigation only
through a [recognized] writ.” (emphasis added)); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 20 (8th ed. 1861) (“In the
courts of common law, both of England and America, there are certain prescribed forms of
action [i.e., writs], to which the party must resort to furnish him a remedy; and, if there be
no prescribed form to reach such a case, he is remediless.”); Bellia, supra note 17, at 786
(“To establish that one had a cause of action under English common law . . . one had to establish the facts that entitled one to judicial relief through an established form of proceeding
[i.e., writ].”).
49
See Main, supra note 36, at 440 (“[P]recise and technical rules of pleadings, procedure
and proof cabined judicial discretion” at common law.).
50
Id. at 442–43.
51
Id. at 440 (“[T]he universe of writs was fixed and their construction by law judges narrowly circumscribed; precise and technical rules of pleadings, procedure and proof cabined
judicial discretion within the form of action.”). Judges were forbidden to depart from the
terms of the writ. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTIONS AT COMMON
LAW 298 (“In the Middle Ages discretion [in the realm of writs] is entirely excluded; all is to
be fixed by iron rules.”).
52
See Main, supra note 36, at 440–41.
53
Id. at 441.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 441–42.
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By the fourteenth century, a distinct court arose under the chancellor—the Court
of Chancery.57 Chancery practice at the beginning was free-form; plaintiffs simply had
to tell the chancellor their story.58 The chancellor was usually an ecclesiastic, not a
trained lawyer.59 As such, he issued relief on ethical, not legal, grounds.60 His “primary
function and concern was not with the [plaintiff] but with the [defendant] and the good
of his soul.”61 If the defendant had acted contrary to fundamental principles of justice
(as determined by the chancellor) the plaintiff prevailed.62 Unlike common-law courts,
juries had no role in equity.63 Nor, for many centuries, did stare decisis.64 Judgments
conformed only to the view of the presiding chancellor, a system of justice that some
derided as arbitrary.65
Over time, Chancery’s decisions fell into a rough pattern such that there came to
be a vaguely definable “law of equity.”66 With this development, an equitable “cause
of action” could be said to exist. That is, there existed multiple situations in which,
given Chancery’s historic propensity to act, plaintiffs had “cause” for taking “action”
in that court.67
Plaintiffs had cause for going to Chancery in two types of situations. One situation
involved the enforcement of claims created anew by equity. Take, for example, the law
of trusts and mortgages. Chancery developed this law as the feudal system declined
and new forms of property ownership became desirable.68 The common law, with its
rigid adherence to stare decisis and writ practice, was unable to adapt to these new
57

Steele, supra note 39, at 11 (noting that the “practice of referring to the Chancellor all
of these special appeals to the king led to the establishment of a tribunal which by the time of
Edward III (1327–1377) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court, with its
separate jurisdiction and mode of procedure and its seat at Westminster”).
58
Main, supra note 36, at 442–43 n.80.
59
HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 4 (1936).
60
See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 4 (1930); Subrin, supra note 45, at
918–19 (“The Equity Court became known as the Court of Conscience. Like ecclesiastical
courts, it operated directly on the defendant’s conscience.”).
61
A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 398–99 (1975).
62
Id. at 399.
63
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 289–90.
64
Id. at 351–53 (describing the “doctrinalization” of Chancery in the eighteenth century).
65
The most famous critique is likely that of John Selden:
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law [we] have a measure . . . . Equity is
according to [the] conscience of him [that] is Chancellor, and as [that]
is larger or narrower, [so] is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make
[the] Standard for [the] measure [we] call A foot, to be [the] Chancellor’s
foot . . . .
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., Quaritch 1927) (1689).
66
Main, supra note 36, at 441–42.
67
Id.
68
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 272.
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circumstances.69 Chancery, not so confined, was able to adapt and thus developed new
and distinct equitable claims.
The second situation in which a plaintiff had cause for filing in Chancery—and the
one most relevant to this Article—involved Chancery’s provision of new and distinct
remedies for the violation of preexisting legal rights. Chief among these new remedies
were injunctions for torts and specific performance for breaches of contract.70 In these
situations, equity by necessity had to work out an arrangement with the common law
as to what law would be applied and when it would even hear a case. Equity worked
this out in two ways. First, equity purported to follow common-law rules in its issuance of injunctive relief, and second, equity purported to withhold relief altogether if
an adequate remedy could be had at law. As explained below, however, these rules
did not tightly constrain equity in its provision of injunctive relief.
1. Equity Follows the Common Law (Sort Of)
Suppose that a plaintiff desired an injunction barring an ongoing trespass to his
property. Such a case implicated both the common law and equity—the common law
provided the law of trespass and equity provided injunctive relief. Given this, where
should the plaintiff file suit: in a common-law court or in equity? A plaintiff could file
at law and ask the court to issue an injunction, or file in equity and ask the court to
apply common-law rules of trespass. Common-law courts, adhering closely to the precise terms of longstanding writs, would not normally issue injunctive relief. Thus, the
standard approach was to file in Chancery and have the court apply the common law.71
Equity was happy to oblige this request and the practice soon took the form of the
maxim “equity follows the law.”72 That is, equity would issue injunctive relief for
common-law violations, but in doing so, it would follow the common law as defined
by courts of law. An injunction could only be had in equity if the plaintiff would have
been able to collect damages for a past harm in the same circumstance.
As with all maxims, however, this one was not perfectly true. While it is true that
equity usually followed the common law, it is not true that the common-law cause of
action was perfectly transported into equity. We are in the habit today of dividing law
into substance and procedure, with the forum court applying its own procedure and
borrowing the substantive law from another jurisdiction.73 If this is a difficult task
69

Id.; MAITLAND, supra note 51, at 7.
See Main, supra note 36, at 443.
71
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 287.
72
Id.
73
This differentiation is required in choice of law circumstances, which are common in
countries with multiple legal systems, such as the United States. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 463–74 (1965) (explaining choice of law analysis for state law actions filed in
federal court); Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250, 252 (N.Y. 1999) (explaining
New York’s choice of law analysis—which is typical of many states—for lawsuits that touch
multiple states).
70
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today,74 it was virtually impossible to do in early modern England. The law was simply a collection of writs that prescribed which steps to take to procure certain types of
relief.75 Indeed, to the extent the law could be labeled at all, it was entirely procedural.76
Thus, it was no easy task for a court of equity to pick from a common-law writ the precise provisions that defined the “right” and leave behind the “procedure.” On many
occasions, therefore, equity issued a remedy in cases that had their doctrinal origin in
the common law but that would not have been successful in a common-law court.
Take, for example, injunctive relief for waste. Waste was a common-law cause
of action against tenants who had damaged the property entrusted to them. The cause
of action at law only extended to plaintiffs who had a definable interest in the property, typically the fee owner.77 Sometimes, however, waste was obviously being committed by a tenant and the putative plaintiff’s interest only amounted to a contingent
remainder.78 The common-law courts found this interest too conjectural to give rise
to a cause of action for waste. Equity, however, intervened to protect those contingent
interests through injunction.79
Herein lies the problem with the blanket statement that “equity follows the law.”80
On the one hand, equity followed the law because it only acted where actual waste was
being committed. On the other hand, equity ignored the law by providing a cause
74
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., the most recent major
choice of law case before the Supreme Court, no justice was able to collect four other votes
to create a controlling majority opinion. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
75
See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text.
76
JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 18
(1969) (explaining that substantive law grew out of procedure: “Courts [were] organized to
handle a series of specific cases, the decisions of which gradually developed theories of rights
and liabilities . . . . [O]ur rights and liabilities as defined by Substantive Law, had their origin
in and developed out of Procedural Law.”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY
LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883) (describing substantive law as “secreted in the interstices of
procedure”); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 381
(5th ed. 1956) (“[S]ubstantive law [is] discussed in terms of procedure. The rights of the
parties [are] expressed in the form of writs and pleading . . . .”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs
to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the Common Law in the Nineteenth
Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2002) (discussing nineteenth-century shift
in the common law towards distinct categories of substance and procedure).
In his Commentaries, Blackstone argued that substance and procedure were actually distinct concepts. See Main, supra note 36, at 461–64 (discussing Blackstone’s attempt to separate
substance and procedure). At that time, however, his characterizations were more of a normative aspiration than a descriptive account. See PLUCKNETT, supra, at 381–82; Alan Watson,
Comment, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J. 795, 804–05 (1988).
77
See 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 259 (2d ed. 1966) (1938).
78
WALSH, supra note 60, at 136 (“At law a contingent remainderman could not sue the
tenant for waste because he had only a possibility of an estate, not an actual fee in remainder.”).
79
Id.; see also 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 913, at 95 (“[T]here are many cases where a person is dispunishable at law for committing waste, and yet a court of equity will enjoin him.”).
80
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 287.
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of action to a plaintiff that would not have had one at law. Is a cause of action defined simply by the harm it addresses, or is it defined by the universe of persons empowered to collect a remedy for a certain harm? Or is it defined by both concerns?
This question may be meaningful to modern lawyers, but it was unimportant—or even
unintelligible—to equity in eighteenth-century England. Equity did not label and sort
the common law; it approached its task much less methodically, guided by the overall
goal of ameliorating the harshness of the common law. This necessarily involved a
departure from the common-law cause of action in various instances.
Chancery’s willingness to enjoin waste that was not actionable at law is not the
only such example. Consider for instance the doctrine of accident. A common application of this doctrine involved lost bonds. If a bondholder, for example, sought to collect
on his bond in a common-law court, but could not present the bond itself (because he
had lost it, for example), the court would typically deny relief.81 Chancery saw matters
differently, however. Chancery permitted the bondholder to declare by affidavit that
he had ownership of the bonds but that they were lost or destroyed.82 If the court found
to its satisfaction that the plaintiff did in fact own the bonds in question, it would enforce the agreement as though the bonds had in fact existed.83
In this case, too, it is difficult to see how Chancery followed the common law. On
the one hand, Chancery did not necessarily create a new cause of action; an action on
a bond was a simple breach of contract action that existed at law for centuries. On the
other hand, Chancery awarded a remedy where common-law courts would have denied
relief. In this instance, plaintiffs had “cause” for going to Chancery where they would
not have had “cause” for going to a common-law court.
Other examples of this behavior—of equity generally following the common law
but refusing to replicate it—are not hard to locate.84 Justice Story, the foremost expert
on English and American equity, summed up the matter this way:
In short, it may be correctly said, that the maxim, that equity follows the law, is a maxim liable to many exceptions; and that it
cannot be generally affirmed that where there is no remedy at law
81

1 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 81–84, at 83–88.
1 id. at 85.
83
1 id.
84
See 1 id. § 64, at 55 (discussing equity’s willingness to “award a perpetual injunction”
in cases where fraud in relation to a marriage contract was perpetrated); 1 id. § 64a, at 56
(discussing cases in which the “statutes [of limitations] would be a bar at law, but in which
equity would, notwithstanding, grant relief”); 1 id. § 64b, at 57 (stating the general rule that
equity follows the “same modes of construing the language and limitations of” legal and trust
estates, but noting exceptions that are “as well known as the rule itself”); 1 id. § 184, at 185–86
(describing the many cases in which courts of equity, “in relieving against [fraud], often go,
not only beyond, but even contrary to, the rules of law”); 1 id. § 446, at 423 (explaining how
the action of account (which was used to force a commercial relation to “account” for funds
entrusted to him) could be maintained in equity against “personal representatives of guardians,
bailiffs, and receivers” although such defendants were not suable at common law).
82
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in the given case, there is none in equity; or, on the other hand, that
equity, in the administration of its own principles, is utterly regardless of the rules of law.85
In sum, although equity often adhered to the key elements of the common law, the
court did not see itself as precisely bound by causes of action at law. At the time of
the American Founding, it was not uncommon for Chancery to enforce the common
law through equitable remedies even where the common law might not itself make
damages available.86
2. Equity Defers to Monetary Relief (Sort Of)
Although equity enjoyed, to some extent, control over its own causes of action,
equitable relief was still subject to a jurisdictional rule known as the “adequate remedy rule.”87 This limit, however, did not restrict Chancery nearly as much as might
be thought.
The rule grew out of Chancery’s ascendancy during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. During this time, Chancery practice became so robust that the common-law
courts no longer saw Chancery as supplementary to the common law; they saw it as
a rival.88 Chancery practice even antagonized Parliament.89 By the sixteenth century,
85
1 id. § 64b, at 57. The historian William Holdsworth has also noted the limitations of
this maxim:
We have seen that, from the earliest times, the Chancellors had emphasized the principle that equity follows the law . . . . On similar principles equity must put the same construction on statutes as that put upon
them by the common law. But, if necessary, it would, both in respect
to the common law and the statute law, go beyond the law, and extend
the principle underlying the law to cover analogous cases which fell
under the same principle; and, in order to follow out the consequences
of its own principles it might be necessary to make departures from the
strict legal rules.
12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 259.
86
Professor Anthony Bellia has explained that, although equity may have enjoyed significant discretion early on, that discretion mostly disappeared by the eighteenth century. See
Bellia, supra note 17, at 789–92. It is true that equity became much more rule-bound during
the colonial era. See LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 351–54. But this does not mean that equity
was as rule-bound as the common law, or that the equitable cause of action closely tracked
the common-law cause of action. The evidence above suggests that relief in equity was, on the
whole, marginally more forthcoming than in law. In any event, even if equitable discretion at
the Founding was limited, equity by then already had established its power to issue injunctive
relief in several categories of cases that, in the late nineteenth century, would frequently appear
in federal courts. See infra notes 101–17, 216–49 and accompanying text.
87
See Main, supra note 36, at 451, 477.
88
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 329–35; Main, supra note 36, at 446–47 (describing the
“jealousy and conflict” between the two courts).
89
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 329.
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the common-law courts had become closely aligned with Parliament while Chancery
remained tied to the Crown.90 Further, Parliament at this time was increasingly at odds
with the Crown over constitutional authority. Parliament no longer recognized the
Crown’s claim to absolute power,91 and thus was apt to resist the powerful claims of
the Crown’s pet court, Chancery.92 Thus, equity’s ever expanding docket was more
than a petty jurisdictional squabble; it was a challenge by the Crown to the authority
of Parliament.
Out of this contentious duel was born a compromise. The compromise worked
as follows: “Chancery would not duplicate the work of the common law courts, but
it would do other judicial work that the common law courts had never done.”93 Or,
put differently, “equity would take jurisdiction only if there were no adequate remedy at law.”94 If a plaintiff came to Chancery seeking damages for injury to his person,
the chancellor would turn him away because an “adequate remedy at law” existed
through the writ of trespass.95 If a plaintiff sought an injunction for repeated or ongoing trespasses, Chancery could assert jurisdiction over the case because damages
were not adequate to resolve the plaintiff’s problem.
There can be no doubt that the adequate remedy rule limited equitable jurisdiction
to some extent. The rule, however, had far less bite than its terms suggest. This was
so for four reasons, three doctrinal and one political.
a. Adequate by Comparison
The adequate remedy rule in practice required legal remedies to be much more
than simply “adequate.” The remedies had to be as adequate as the remedies provided
by Chancery.96 Moreover, the concept of adequacy was highly malleable. Professor
90

Id.
Id. (“The conflict [between courts of law and equity] became embedded in the larger
constitutional controversy about the respective powers of the king (and his Council) vis-à-vis
those of Parliament and the common law courts.”).
92
Id.; Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over
Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald Fleming & Bernard
Bailyn eds., 1971) (“By the late sixteenth century, and especially with the accession of the
Stuarts, the court of chancery was closely associated with the royal prerogative and became
the target of opposition.”).
93
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 20 (1991).
94
Id.
95
Id.; LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 103.
96
See, e.g., Lewis v. Lechmere, (1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B.) 829; 10 Mod. 503, 506
(holding that jurisdiction in equity was available even where a legal remedy was available because the “remedy . . . had at law, was not a remedy adequate to what [the plaintiff] had in
this Court”). For examples of legal remedies that were available but considered less useful than
the equitable remedy, see 1 STORY, supra note 48, § 80, at 83; § 443, at 421, § 535, at 522;
§ 649, at 623; §§ 661–62, at 633; § 702, at 678.
91
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Thomas Main has noted that, to be adequate, “the remedy at law had to be as ‘plain,’
‘certain,’ ‘prompt,’ ‘adequate,’ ‘full,’ ‘practical,’ ‘just,’ ‘final,’ ‘complete,’ and ‘efficient’ as the remedy in equity.”97 Obviously, “this language left much to the discretion
of the chancellor, and consistent with the general principle of equity to address new
or unforeseen circumstances, the equities in each case controlled the court’s exercise
of that broad discretion.”98 Thus, if Chancery was determined to take jurisdiction in
a particular case, it was not hard to find the legal remedy inadequate.
b. Once Established, Never Lost
Chancery and the common-law courts existed side by side for hundreds of years.
Over time, common-law remedies occasionally evolved to the point that they might
be considered adequate. Even in these instances, however, Chancery refused to give up
jurisdiction.99 The court reasoned that, having obtained jurisdiction over a particular
type of case in years past, it could not be divested of that jurisdiction through innovation at the common law.100 Thus, if equitable relief was once available, it remained
available—even if admittedly adequate common-law remedies had developed in the
intervening years.
c. Ordinary at Times
The application of the “adequate remedy rule” is how injunctions came to be
characterized as extraordinary. If injunctions could only be had when a legal remedy
was unavailable, injunctions were special, not routine. They were, in other words,
“extraordinary.”
The moniker “extraordinary,” however, is misleading. It may have been true that
damages were awarded far more often than injunctions in eighteenth-century England.
But calling injunctive relief “extraordinary” on this basis obscures the fact that, in several categories of cases, injunctions were available as a matter of course. In these cases,
legal relief was per se inadequate and the injunction was the “ordinary” remedy. For
our purposes, three categories of such cases are most important.
Suits involving a prospective interest in real or personal property. Equity was
nearly always willing to intervene by injunction to protect a plaintiff’s interest in real
97

Main, supra note 36, at 451–52.
Id. at 452.
99
1 STORY, supra note 48, § 64i, at 62–63 (“[I]f, originally, the jurisdiction has properly
attached in equity in any case, on account of the supposed defect of remedy at law, that jurisdiction is not changed or obliterated by the courts of law now entertaining jurisdiction in such
cases, when they formerly rejected it.”).
100
1 id. § 64, at 63 (“[I]t cannot be left to courts of law to enlarge, or to restrain the powers
of courts of equity at their pleasure . . . . Being once vested legitimately in the court, it must
remain there, until the legislature shall abolish, or limit it.”).
98
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property. If a plaintiff contracted to buy land but the buyer backed out, injunctive relief
(also known as “specific performance”) could be had.101 The same rule applied if the
plaintiff’s land was subject to injury through trespass or waste,102 or if his rights to personal property were in jeopardy.103 In all of these circumstances, Chancery had come
to believe that the plaintiff’s right of ownership and possession was so distinctive that
damages could never be adequately measured.104 Additionally, even if damages could
be calculated, the defendant might not cease his wrongful behavior and the plaintiff
would be forced to bring an action at law over and over again.105
Suits involving prospective business interests. Equity routinely intervened to protect
through injunction the trade interests of plaintiffs.106 Thus, a plaintiff with an exclusive
franchise could obtain an injunction protecting the franchise.107 Similarly, plaintiffs
possessing valid patents or copyrights could obtain injunctive relief.108 Chancery also
imposed injunctions in cases involving exchange of money, stocks, and financial
instruments.109 Trade secrets were also protected by injunction110 and fraudulent sales
were enjoined.111 The justification for injunctive relief in these circumstances was
similar to that in the property realm. The merchant or inventor’s loss of competitive
101

2 STORY, supra note 48, § 908, at 90–91.
ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 179–95, 259–75
(1839) (discussing waste and nuisance); 2 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 928–29, at 110–12.
103
2 STORY, supra note 48, § 956, at 139.
104
2 id. § 932, at 113; EDEN, supra note 102, at 277–306, 307–35 (discussing injunctions
to restrain infringement of patents and copyright).
105
2 STORY, supra note 48, § 930, at 112 (explaining equity’s historical willingness to grant
an injunction to avoid a “multiplicity of suits”).
106
2 id. § 927, at 107 (“[A]n injunction will be granted against a corporation, to prevent
an abuse of the powers granted to them to the injury of other persons.”).
107
2 id. § 927, at 108 (“[A]n injunction will be granted in favor of parties, possessing a
statute privilege or franchise, to secure the enjoyment of it from invasion by other parties.”).
108
In a study of copyright injunctions issued by Chancery in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Professor Gómez-Arostegui has concluded:
In the year 1789, and in all the years preceding it in which the Chancery
heard infringement cases, the inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement
played no active role in deciding whether to issue a copyright injunction.
No court opinion or order in a copyright case ever required an affirmative
showing of inadequacy, nor did other contemporary materials suggest one
was required. It was not argued by plaintiffs, as far as can be discerned
from the records, nor did it ever form the basis for denying a motion. On
the contrary, the historical record suggests that in copyright cases, legal
remedies were deemed categorically inadequate.
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the
Inadequate Remedy at Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2008).
109
2 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 954–55, at 138.
110
2 id. § 952, at 137.
111
2 id. § 954, at 137.
102
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advantage was incredibly difficult, if not impossible to calculate.112 Moreover, if injunctive relief was not issued, the wrongful behavior might easily persist.113
Suits involving a defense not recognized at law. This category of equitable suits
differs in form from the first two. In those cases, the injunction was necessary because
damages would fail to adequately remedy the harm alleged; in these cases, the injunction was necessary to ensure that an equitable defense would not be forfeited in a court
of law.114 For example, if a plaintiff charged a defendant with breach of contract in a
common-law court, the defendant often could not raise the defense of fraud; commonlaw courts only permitted the defense in limited circumstances.115 In these situations,
the defendant would go to Chancery and ask for an injunction barring the plaintiff
from continuing his suit at law, a request Chancery would honor.116 In barring litigants
from pursuing common-law relief, Chancery essentially barred enforcement of the
common law generally (to the extent it ran afoul of equity). Chancery would issue such
injunctions in an enormous variety of circumstances.117
In the three circumstances discussed thus far, injunctive relief was not extraordinary, it was the norm. Thus, while it may be true that injunctions, when viewed against
the entire body of remedies, were extraordinary, it is not true when specific categories
of cases are considered. In the circumstances above, injunctive relief would have been
easily accessible.
d. Not Legal, Political
On its face, the adequate remedy rule seemed to preserve for courts of law at
least some of their historic jurisdiction. As we have seen, however, the superiority
of injunctive relief over damages made it an ordinary remedy in several categories
112

2 id. § 927, at 107.
In the case of copyright, the sale of copies by the defendant is not only
in each instance taking from the author the profit upon the individual
book . . . but . . . may also be injuring [the plaintiff], to an incalculable
extent, in regard to the value and disposition of [the plaintiff’s] copyright,
which no inquiry for the purpose of damages could fully ascertain.
2 id. § 932, at 113.
114
[I]n all cases where, by accident, or mistake, or fraud, or otherwise, a
party has an unfair advantage in proceedings in a court of law, which
must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, and it is,
therefore, against conscience, that he should use that advantage, a court
of equity will interfere, and restrain him from using that advantage which
he has thus improperly gained . . . .
2 id. § 885, at 73; see also EDEN, supra note 102, at 14–68.
115
2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73; WALSH, supra note 60, at 492.
116
2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73.
117
2 id. § 885, at 73 (“[T]he occasions on which an injunction may be used to stay proceedings at law are almost infinite in their nature and circumstances.”).
113
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of cases.118 In grasping this, it is important to appreciate how exactly equity got away
with this. That is, how did equity manage to declare, ipso facto, that legal remedies
were inadequate—even in cases where such remedies were likely available?
The key to Chancery’s success in this realm lies in the fact that it was Chancery,
not courts of law, that determined whether legal remedies were adequate or not.
Chancery managed this feat through an innovative (and contentious) use of its injunctive power: the enjoining of common-law adjudication.119 If Chancery believed
equitable jurisdiction was appropriate, it routinely barred the parties from filing a
companion suit in a common-law court.120 Chancery enforced its injunctions through
imprisonment, so parties were apt to take this order seriously.121
Courts of law, in contrast, had no injunctive power. Without such power, they
had had no way of barring litigants from resorting to courts of equity.122 Chancery
could thus determine which cases it would hear. In terms of the adequate remedy rule,
Chancery could decide for itself whether a plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law.
In practice, this meant that the “limits on equitable jurisdiction were enforced only by
equity’s sense of self-restraint and by the risk of political reaction.”123 For this reason,
and the three others above, the adequate remedy rule had little legal bite and Chancery
had significant power to award relief where it saw fit.
***
In sum, English law and equity worked in distinctive ways. The existence of a
cause of action for damages was controlled by the writ. Each writ precisely defined the
way in which a suit was to be adjudicated. Common-law judges had no power to invent
new writs or vary the terms of a writ, though judges could enforce statutes through
preexisting writs if the harm suffered by the plaintiff fit within the writ.
In contrast, a cause of action in Chancery was far less restricted. In issuing injunctions, Chancery attempted to “follow the common law” but did not view the commonlaw writ as binding. In these situations, it is accurate to say that Chancery created a
cause of action where none had existed before. Chancery’s injunctive power was limited to an extent by the “adequate remedy rule,” which gave injunctions their “extraordinary” characterization. The rule had little bite, however, because Chancery itself was
118

See supra notes 101–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
120
2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73.
121
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 286.
122
See LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21 (“In any case of conflict between legal and equitable
rules, the equitable rule controlled, because the equity court could enjoin the proceedings at
law. The rules of the common law were enforceable only so long as the equity judges did not
become dissatisfied with them.”); MAITLAND, supra note 51, at 257 (“The Chancellor could
say to a person ‘You must not go to a court of law,’ and the court of law had no power to say
‘You must not go to a court of equity.’”).
123
LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21.
119
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in charge of applying it and interpreted it narrowly. Moreover, the “extraordinary”
characterization of injunctive relief is misleading because Chancery issued injunctions as a matter of course in several situations.
II. FEDERAL EQUITY AT THE FOUNDING AND BEYOND
The Founding Generation was familiar with English equity practice. The Constitution itself makes clear that the federal judiciary would have jurisdiction over certain
cases “in law and equity.”124 What the Constitution did not specify, however, was
what role federal equity would have in constitutional enforcement. As we know today,
however, “equitable relief has become the standard remedy for most constitutional
violations, and one which is available essentially as a matter of right.”125 In this Part,
I identify the roots of the federal courts’ modern approach to equity.
The roots are twofold. First, as in England, federal equity lived a life separate
from law. At the Founding, Congress obliged the federal courts to follow state law in
common-law actions, but permitted the courts to develop their own “common law of
chancery” in equitable actions.126 Thus, as long as the courts could obtain subject matter jurisdiction over a suit in equity, they were free to determine whether a cause of
action should exist or not.127 Second, federal equity was affected by the dramatic economic and social changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These
changes put before the Court numerous important constitutional cases that were perfectly fit for equitable relief. These cases involved prospective rights to property, prospective rights to business interests, or legal actions in which equitable defenses might
not be recognized—all cases in which injunctive relief had long been an ordinary, not
extraordinary, remedy.
A. Equity Unleashed
If the federal equity power was to grow, it had to be free of any significant constraint. At its founding, federal equity escaped constraint in three important ways.
First, the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction was placed in the same court as that of
law, thus significantly reducing the political restraints that had hemmed in English
equity.128 Second, Congress gave the federal courts the freedom to create a distinctly
federal law of equity—a law that could be (and was) detached from state common law.
Federal courts were not obliged to, and did not in practice, “follow the common law.”129
124

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 961, 1008 (1998).
126
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 563 (1852).
127
Id. at 563–64.
128
Id. at 563; LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21.
129
See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
125
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Third, the federal courts not only adopted English equity’s weak “adequate remedy
rule,” but the courts watered down the rule even further by declaring state remedies
per se inadequate.130
1. One Court, Two Sides
In England, law and equity had long been administered by separate court systems.
In America, however, the Founders combined the two jurisdictions into a single court
system. Federal courts were given the power to adjudicate “suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity” that fell within one of the courts’ subject matter grants.131
Under this system, a particular judge might hear a common-law action in the morning
and then in the afternoon hear an equitable action.132 The choice to put the two jurisdictions into a single court may seem like a purely administrative decision based on
the expediencies of the day. And perhaps it was. It was a decision, however, that was
to have important effects on the federal equity power.
As explained in the preceding Part, the rivalry between law and equity (and by
extension, Parliament and the Crown) led to a jurisdictional compromise.133 Equity
would only take jurisdiction if there was no adequate remedy at law. This compromise
put equity in the driver’s seat, however, for it was equity that had the power (using
injunctions) to determine whether legal remedies were adequate or not.134 Under this
arrangement, the “limits on equitable jurisdiction were enforced only by equity’s sense
of self-restraint and by the risk of political reaction.”135
By placing jurisdiction over both law and equity before the same judges, Congress
effectively removed one of the tools that kept English equity in check. Unlike an
English court of equity, a federal judge would have no concern that the provision of
equitable relief would raise the ire of a separate court of law. Cases at law or in equity
were decided by the same judge. A judge could hardly fear that he would insult himself by taking equitable jurisdiction.136
Without the “risk of political reaction,” much of the federal courts’ equitable jurisprudence would depend on its “sense of self-restraint.”137 Of course, federal courts
130

See discussion infra Part II.A.3.b.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
132
LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 382 (“Each federal district court was conceived to have
a law side and an equity side, even though the same judge presided in both.”).
133
See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
134
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
135
LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21.
136
Id. (“After law and equity were committed to the same judges, or at least to judges
selected by the same political process, the political reasons for restraining equity largely
faded away.”).
137
Id.; see also WALSH, supra note 60, at 133–34 (commenting on how the merger of law
and equity into a single court ended the “jealousy, hostility and competition” which had animated much of equity law).
131

2013]

IN DEFENSE OF IMPLIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

23

would be obliged to obey congressional orders prescribing or proscribing particular
relief, but as explained below, the courts faced few restrictions in this regard during
the nineteenth century.138 Thus, to a considerable extent, the federal courts use of equitable remedies depended simply on whether injunctions were appropriate to the goals
of the court, whatever those goals might be.
2. A “Common Law of Chancery”
When Congress created the federal courts in 1789, it faced a difficult question:
when sitting in diversity, which law should the trial courts apply?139 For cases at law,
Congress hit upon an easy solution. Federal courts would follow state law.140 For example, if a Virginian punched a Marylander in Baltimore, and the Marylander brought
suit in federal court seeking damages, the court would apply Maryland law—likely
the writ of trespass.141
When it came to equity cases, however, Congress did not order federal courts to
follow state law. The reason was simple: equity in the states was in disarray at the
138

See discussion infra Part III.
Diversity was the federal courts’ chief basis of jurisdiction at the Founding. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79. The courts did not acquire their general federal
question jurisdiction until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
140
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (“[T]he laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply.”); Temporary Process Act, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93
(1789) (stating that the “modes of process . . . in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme
courts of the same”). The Temporary Process Act was made permanent two years later in the
Permanent Process Act. See Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) (stating
that the procedures followed in the federal courts “shall be the same as are now used in the
[federal] courts [as prescribed by the Temporary Process Act]”). Note that § 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as presently amended is also referred to as the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g.,
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1516 n.14 (1984); see also infra
Part III.C.
141
To be sure, federal courts sometimes drew instead upon a body of “general common
law.” See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 11–12 (1842). The prominence of general common law is often overestimated, however. Federal courts did develop a common law that was
disconnected with any particular state, but the courts usually refrained from applying it to
matters of “peculiarly local concern.” Fletcher, supra note 140, at 1527–28. In the nineteenth
century, this was no insignificant category of cases. As Professor Kristin Collins has recently
explained, “with certain important exceptions, including the general common law, conformity
[with local law] was the general and expected practice.” Kristin A. Collins, ‘A Considerable
Surgical Operation’: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 249, 264–65 (2010); see also id. at 253–54 (“[F]ederal judges enjoyed considerably
greater power to apply nonstate, judge-made principles when sitting in equity than when sitting in law—greater, even, than the power they were allowed under the Swift doctrine.”).
139
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Founding. To begin with, many states refused to recognize equity at all.142 Equity’s
reputation was marred by “the lack of jury trial[s], . . . abuses by colonial governors
while serving as chancellors, and . . . resentment over the discretionary powers and
royalist associations of the English Court of Chancery.”143 Even if a state desired to
institute a court of equity, however, equity practice was haphazard because “English
precedents were inaccessible and not well settled.”144
Without a coherent body of equity law at the state level, Congress had little choice
but to establish a general law of equity that was unconnected to any particular state.145
In the Permanent Process Act of 1792, Congress directed federal courts to adjudicate
equitable actions “according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts
of equity . . . as contradistinguished from courts of common law.”146 In this same statute, Congress also gave the federal courts the power to make “alterations and additions
as the . . . courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient,” and specifically
permitted the Supreme Court to enact rules of equity that it “shall think proper.”147
This left it to the federal courts to develop and maintain their own law of equity.
Almost immediately, the courts adopted the practices of their English predecessors.
The first Chief Justice, John Jay, directed the federal courts to “consider[ ] the practices of the courts of the King’s Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice” in equity.148 In the ensuing decades, the federal courts would
several times enact their own distinctive rules of equity.149 Equity was thus not only
distinctively federal, but distinctively within the control of the federal courts.
This understanding of federal equity was on display in the prominent case of
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.150 The case involved a dispute
142

1 STORY, supra note 46, § 56, at 62 n.1 (“Equity jurisprudence scarcely had an existence,
in any large and appropriate sense of the term, in any part of New England, during its colonial
state.”); Collins, supra note 141, at 266–68.
143
CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND
DAMAGES 8 (8th ed. 2011); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 54 (2d ed. 1985) (“Hostility to chancery was widespread in the 18th century.”).
144
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & SIDNEY POST SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE 162 (3d ed. 1950); see also LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 353 (“Chancery
law reporting remained primitive into the middle of the eighteenth century.”).
145
One might wonder why the Founders, with their suspicion of unchecked discretion,
would adopt equity jurisdiction for the federal courts in the first place. Kristin Collins explains
that, while some Founders disapproved of equity jurisdiction, the jurisdiction was ultimately
approved because “the practical need for equity power was overwhelming. Without equity
jurisdiction, federal courts would have no power in actions raising issues of fraud, mistake,
hardship, or trusts.” Collins, supra note 141, at 269.
146
See Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
147
Id.
148
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792).
149
The rules were reported in the U.S. Reports. See 226 U.S. 627, 629 (1912); 42 U.S. (1
How.) xii (1842); 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v–xiii (1822).
150
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852).
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between the owners of a bridge over the Ohio River and the state of Pennsylvania.151
Pennsylvania alleged that the bridge had been built too low and that, as a result,
ships were unable to pass under it and commerce into the state was impeded.152 This
impediment amounted to a nuisance, argued the state, and was grounds for injunctive relief.153
The Court granted the injunction.154 In doing so, the Court was forced to take up
the argument that the suit was not authorized by state law. Were the suit one at law,
this would have been dispositive, for
[i]t is clear there can be no common law of the United States.
The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign
and independent States, each of which may have its local usages,
customs, and common law . . . . The common law could be made
a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption. When,
therefore, a common-law right is asserted, we must look to the
State in which the controversy originated.155
The suit was not brought under the common law, however. By seeking injunctive
relief, Pennsylvania had invoked the federal judiciary’s equitable powers. In exercising these powers, the Court explained:
[T]he courts of the Union are not limited by the chancery system
adopted by any State, and they exercise their functions in a State
where no court of chancery has been established. The usages of
the High Court of Chancery in England, whenever the jurisdiction is exercised, govern the proceedings. This may be said to be
the common law of chancery, and since the organization of the
government, it has been observed.156
To be sure, the federal court did not gain power over the case only because the plaintiff sought equitable relief. Without some basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,
a federal court would have had no such power.157 But once a federal court obtained
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 521.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 564, 625.
Id. at 564 (quoting Wheaton & Donaldson v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 595 (1834)).
Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
As the Court explained it:
Chancery jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United States
with the limitation “that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either
of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and
complete remedy may be had at law.” The rules of the High Court of
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subject matter jurisdiction over a suit, it was authorized to exercise complete control
over the suit under the federal “common law of chancery.” This power included the
decision whether or not to even recognize the cause of action in the first place.
What is conspicuously absent in Wheeling Bridge is any mention of equity “following the law.”158 Recall from above that Chancery in England often (but not always)
“followed the law,” i.e., issued equitable relief where a legal right existed under the
common law.159 An injunction would normally only issue in a trespass case if the plaintiff could later obtain damages for the finished harm. This kept equity somewhat in line
with common-law norms. In Wheeling Bridge, however, the Court made no effort to
follow Virginia law (which would have controlled in a suit at law). Even though the
Court presided over a common law of chancery, it had previously declared that the
“practice[s] of the courts of the King’s Bench and Chancery in England . . . afford[ ]
[the] outlines for the practice.”160 So if Chancery often followed the law in England,
why shouldn’t federal courts also do so in America?
The reason is because the federal courts sat atop a federalist system. “Following
the law,” therefore, would challenge the federal courts’ commitment to federal supremacy and uniformity. Take the matter of supremacy. If a court were to issue injunctive
relief to enforce federal rights only where a cause of action at law would have existed,
the enforcement of federal law would be subject to the whims of state law. Indeed, if
federal courts followed the law, they might end up simultaneously ignoring the law—
the law of the constitutional supremacy. This was of obvious concern to the Court in
Wheeling Bridge. Although there was state law that addressed the issue, Congress had
already exercised authority over the Ohio River by issuing licenses and approving interstate compacts.161 With a federal interest established, it made little sense to resort to
Chancery of England have been adopted by the courts of the United
States. And there is no other limitation to the exercise of a chancery
jurisdiction by these courts, except the value of the matter in controversy,
the residence or character of the parties, or a claim which arises under
a law of the United States, and which has been decided against in a
State court.
Id. (emphasis added).
158
Also absent is any discussion of whether damages were an adequate remedy sufficient
to preclude equitable relief. The federal courts’ application of the adequate remedy rule is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 167–89.
159
See supra text accompanying notes 71–86.
160
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 409, 413 (1792).
161
Wheeling, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 565. The Court explained it thus:
[Congress has] regulated navigation upon [the Ohio River], . . . by licensing vessels, establishing ports of entry, imposing duties upon masters and
other officers of boats, and inflicting severe penalties for neglect of those
duties, by which damage to life or property has resulted. And [Congress
has] expressly sanctioned the compact made by Virginia with Kentucky,
at the time of its admission into the Union, “that the use and navigation
of the River Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed State, or the
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state law to determine if it would supply a cause of action at law, for “[n]o State law
can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress. Nor
can any State violate the compact, sanctioned as it has been, by obstructing the navigation of the river.”162
The other reason for federal equity to ignore state law was the goal of uniformity.
Lawmakers and judges of the nineteenth century considered uniform federal law important to economic growth and the effectiveness of federal leadership.163 Professor Kristin
Collins has explained how the federal courts’ nineteenth-century equity jurisprudence
was in substantial part “a response to contemporary concerns about disuniformity.”164
If the state law were to control the availability of federal equity, then the law of equity
could differ in each state. The federal courts did not want this, however; they wanted
the law of equity to be “the same in all states of the union.”165
Wheeling Bridge is only one case, but it is emblematic of the Court’s equity jurisprudence of the era.166 The availability of a cause of action in federal equity was under
the control of the federal courts and was not tethered to common-law rules. As a general matter, Congress stayed out of the way, too—except for imposing one limitation
that turned out to be rather modest.
territory that shall remain within the limits of this Commonwealth lies
thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States.”
Id.
162

Id. at 566.
See, e.g., Collins, supra note 141, at 315.
164
Id. at 256. Professor Collins also argues that federal courts used their equity jurisprudence
to provide a federal judicial presence in states that, because they became part of the Union after
1789, would have otherwise lacked the benefits of federal adjudication. Id. at 291–330.
165
Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635, 658 (1832). See generally Livingston v. Story,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835).
166
See also Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 316–17 (1885) (“Where the rights
in jeopardy are those . . . which the Constitution of the United States [confers], . . . jurisdiction
in equity [is] vested by the Constitution of the United States, and . . . cannot be affected by the
legislation of the States.”); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868) (stating that federal jurisdiction “is subject to neither limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform
throughout the different States of the Union”); Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 272
(1851) (“Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined, under the judicial power of
the United States, the same principles of equity must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of
the United States, and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles are . . . .”);
Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 674–75 (1850) (“Whatever may be the laws of
Texas [regarding pleading] . . . they do not govern the proceedings in the courts of the United
States . . . . [If a party asserts an equitable claim, he] must proceed according to the rules which
this court has prescribed . . . regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United
States.”); Boyle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 658 (“The chancery jurisdiction given by the constitution
and laws of the United States is the same in all states of the union . . . .”); United States v.
Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 112 (1819) (“The powers and practice of the Circuit Courts,
in Chancery cases, are not to be controlled by the local laws of the states where those Courts
sit. They are the same throughout the Union.”).
163
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3. A Modest Limitation, Made More Modest
Even though Congress gave the federal courts enormous discretion in managing
federal equity, it did restrain them slightly by imposing the traditional limitation applied in English Chancery: the adequate remedy rule. In Section 16 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress barred equity from taking jurisdiction “in any case where
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”167 As noted above, the
rule in England had less bite than its terms might suggest, however, for four reasons:
(1) “adequacy” required that the legal remedy be not just adequate on its own, but as
fitting and appropriate as the remedy in equity; (2) having once obtained jurisdiction,
equity refused to relinquish it, even if a remedy at law was invented; (3) there were
clear categories of cases in which legal remedies were considered per se inadequate;
and (4) it was equity, not law, that determined whether legal remedies were adequate.168
As explained below, each of these applied in federal equity, thus sustaining in the federal courts the expansive jurisdiction known to Chancery. Not only that, but the federal courts even narrowed further the remedies that would qualify was adequate, thus
enlarging its equitable jurisdiction even more.
a. A Modest Limitation
In the federal courts’ view, the statutory declaration of the adequate remedy rule
charted no new ground. The rule was “merely declaratory” of the traditional “rules of
equity on the subject of legal remedy.”169 It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the
federal courts closely followed the English understanding of the rule.
First, the federal courts, like Chancery, demanded a great deal out of a legal remedy before declaring it “adequate.” An early case, Baker v. Biddle,170 illustrates this
high bar well. There, the court declared that a legal remedy will be considered inadequate if “the remedy is doubtful, difficult, not adequate to the object, not so complete as in equity, . . . [or] not so efficient and practicable to the ends of justice and its
prompt administration.”171 Nor would equitable jurisdiction be foreclosed, the court
held, “where the competency of law falls short of the equum et bonum of the case,
[or] where there is some difference in the remedy.”172 Speaking of the adequate remedy rule in 1819, Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, explained that “the
ground of the equity jurisdiction is not that the common law courts are incompetent
167
168
169
170
171
172

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
See supra Part I.B.2.
Boyce’s Ex’rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830).
2 F. Cas. 439, 446 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764).
Id. at 446.
Id.
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to afford a remedy, but that such a remedy is less complete than the court of equity,
from the nature of its organization, is capable of affording.”173 Numerous other cases
confirm this approach.174
Second, the federal courts adopted the same categories of per se inadequacy as
English equity. Disputes involving a prospective interest in real or personal property
were routinely resolved through injunctive relief.175 So too did the Court award injunctive relief in cases involving prospective business interests.176 And finally, federal
173
Harrison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 666, 668 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.J. 1819)
(No. 6143) (emphasis added).
174
See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 515 (1889) (stating that, although relief
could have been had at law, the remedy was not as “efficient as the remedy which equity would
confer under the same circumstances”); Boyce’s Ex’rs, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 215 (“[Even though
action at law was available], [i]t was obviously not an adequate remedy, because it was a partial
one. The complainant would still have been left to renew the contest upon a series of suits; and
that probably after the death of witnesses.”); United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108,
115 (1819) (“[T]he remedy in Chancery, where all parties may be brought before the Court, is
more complete and adequate, as the sum actually due may be there, in such cases, ascertained
with more certainty and facility . . . .”); Hayden v. Thompson, 71 F. 60, 63 (C.C.D. Mo. 1895)
(invoking equity in actions involving fraud by twenty four creditors even though legal remedy
was available because multiple “actions at law [would not be] as efficient, as practical, and as
prompt to attain the ends of justice as this suit in equity”); Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 668 (“[T]here
are a number of cases in which . . . the ground of the equity jurisdiction is not that the common
law courts are incompetent to afford a remedy, but that such a remedy is less complete than
the court of equity, from the nature of its organization, is capable of affording.”); see also
supra note 96.
175
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,
564–65 (1851) (prohibiting the building of a bridge that would have impeded travel along the
Ohio River); Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (awarding injunction
to protect federal franchise); Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 666 (resolving a dispute between a trustee
and the beneficiaries).
176
See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 355 (1916) (holding, with
regard to state regulation restricting the use of coupons, “that the condition of complainants’
businesses and of the property engaged in them was such that the statute, if [the regulation
were] exerted against complainants and their property, would produce irreparable injury”); Am.
Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. MacAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 100 (1902) (holding equitable relief
proper because that postal inspector’s refusal to deliver mail to a mail-order business would
result in “eventually embarrassing, crippling, breaking up, and destroying complainants’ legitimate business”); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12 (1898) (“It
would be impossible to say what would be the damage incurred at any particular moment, since
such damage might be more or less dependent upon whether the competition of the city should
ultimately destroy, or only interfere with the business of the plaintiff.”); Watson v. Sutherland,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 79 (1866) (“Loss of trade, destruction of credit, and failure of business
prospects, are collateral or consequential damages, which it is claimed would result from the
trespass, but for which compensation cannot be awarded in a trial at law. Commercial ruin to
Sutherland might, therefore, be the effect of closing his store and selling his goods, and yet
the common law fail to reach the mischief.”).
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courts were also willing to enjoin prosecutions at law where the legal action would
contravene the equitable rights of the would-be defendant.177
Third, like Chancery, federal equity refused to give back its jurisdiction when law
invented an obviously adequate remedy. As the Court put it in Harrison v. Rowan,
where a case falls within one of the “general branches of equity jurisdiction” that has
been recognized over time, “it is no objection to its exercise that the party may have a
remedy at law.”178 The common law (to the extent it could ever displace a federal equity
action to begin with)179 could not be redesigned to take equitable jurisdiction away.
Fourth, and briefly, just as in English equity, there was little that controlled equity
in its determination of legal adequacy.180 In fact, federal courts were even more free
than Chancery to declare legal relief inadequate. As noted above, federal judges possessed both legal and equitable jurisdiction and thus had no concern that disregarding legal relief would bring adverse consequences from the law side of the docket.181
b. Made More Modest
The adequate remedy rule was thus a modest limitation on the federal courts. Yet
the Supreme Court limited it further by holding that an entire swath of remedies were
per se inadequate: remedies available only in state court.182 An early explanation of
177

See, e.g., Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 374 (1916) (making an injunction available because, if the “prosecuting attorney of the county . . . enforce[s] the provisions of the statute,”
the plaintiff “will lose many customers and a large amount of trade and suffer thereby great
loss and injury”); Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 686 (1895) (“Bills in equity to enjoin actions
at law are not infrequently brought by defendants in such actions to enable them to avail themselves of defences which would not be valid at law.”); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314, 316
(1894) (approving “bill in equity brought by the [plaintiffs] to enjoin the [defendant] from
prosecuting an action of ejectment in the court below, against the appellees, to recover possession of the lands in controversy”); Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S. 241, 252 (1887) (allowing
defendant in civil suit to “resort[ ] to a court of equity to enforce a defence to an action at law”);
Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 355, 376 (1872) (refusing a bill in equity only because the plaintiff possessed “[a complete] defence to the suit at law”); Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871) (recognizing that a plaintiff could obtain an injunction
only if the defense he expected to rely upon was not recognized at common law); Hipp v. Babin,
60 U.S. (14 How.) 271, 277 (1856) (stating that injunctive relief would be available, upon a
proper showing, for “preventing suits” at law); see also 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 874, at 189.
178
Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 668.
179
See infra Part II.B.2.
180
See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“‘An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the
determinations of courts of equity’ . . . flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [equity
jurisdiction].” (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943))).
181
See supra text accompanying notes 131–37.
182
See, e.g., Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 9341) (holding that federal courts may afford a common-law remedy to enforce
a state law, but cannot exclude the equitable jurisdiction of the court).
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this came from Justice Story, riding circuit, in Mayer v. Foulkrod.183 In that case, the
defendant argued that federal equity jurisdiction was unavailable “because the plaintiff might have maintained an action [at law] in the state court.”184 Story rejected this
argument out of hand:
No objection can be made to the jurisdiction of the equity side
of [this court], but that there is complete and adequate remedy
on the other side of this court. It is no argument to say that the
plaintiff may have such a remedy . . . in the state court. The conclusive answer is, that the plaintiff is under no obligation to resort
to that jurisdiction.185
Mayer states a rule that was consistently followed in the federal courts.186 The rule
was based on two concerns. First, where Congress had provided federal courts with
subject matter jurisdiction (usually diversity, but later, federal question as well) plaintiffs therefore possessed a constitutional right to sue in federal court.187 A state, being
183

Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1234.
185
Id. (emphasis added).
186
See, e.g., Petroleum Exploration v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ky., 304 U.S. 209, 217 (1938)
(“It is settled that no adequate remedy at law exists, so as to deprive federal courts of equity
jurisdiction, unless it is available in the federal courts.”); Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins.
Ass’n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935) (“If a plaintiff is entitled to be heard in the federal courts he may
resort to equity when the remedy at law there is inadequate, regardless of the adequacy of the
legal remedy which the state courts may afford.”); Risty v. Chi., R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U.S.
378, 388 (1926) (“[The proposed alternative remedy] is not one which may be availed of at law
in the federal courts, and the test of equity jurisdiction in a federal court is the inadequacy
of the remedy on the law side of that court and not the inadequacy of the remedies afforded
by the state courts.”); Chi., B. & Q. R.R. v. Osborne, 265 U.S. 14, 16 (1924) (“[The proposed
alternative remedy] can be sued out only in the State, and a remedy in the State Courts only
has been held not to be enough.”); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 516 (1898) (“One who is
entitled to sue in the Federal Circuit Court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the
established principles and rules of equity permit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be
deprived of that right by reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state court on the same
cause of action.”); Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U.S. 86, 99 (1889) (stating, in response to the
assertion that a Missouri probate court provided relief, “[t]he Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Missouri, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear and determine this controversy,
notwithstanding the peculiar structure of the Missouri probate system”); Payne v. Hook, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 429 (1868) (rejecting a state remedy as an adequate alternative because a
“citizen of one State has the constitutional right to sue a citizen of another State in the courts
of the United States, instead of resorting to a State tribunal”).
187
Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 429 (noting that a “citizen of one State has the constitutional
right to sue a citizen of another State in the courts of the United States, instead of resorting
to a State tribunal”).This reasoning is dubious, see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850), but it
nonetheless played a role in the Court’s decisions in this field.
184
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subordinate to federal rights, could not take that federal right away.188 Second, the
federal courts preferred to maintain a clear line between federal law and equity.189 If
state law remedies were part of the equation, the line between law and equity would
constantly shift, and do so on a state-by-state basis.
B. Opportunity Knocks
In the prior section, I explained how the federal courts came to possess a robust
power over equity. The power to issue relief is, of course, important, but the mere existence of this power does mean that federal equity was destined to become an established tool of constitutional enforcement. This would only happen if the power met
opportunity. This is exactly what happened in the decades surrounding the turn of the
twentieth century. In that era, dramatic social, economic, and political changes put before the Court significant numbers of constitutional cases that were perfectly fit for the
Court’s equitable powers.190 As a result, the federal courts’ power to issue injunctive
relief in constitutional cases was converted into standard practice.191
1. Powerful Forces
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the country was in a period
of incredible change. This was the era of the railroad, of the corporation, of mass
production.192 Population skyrocketed by forty percent in the fifteen years ending in
1893, most of it in urban centers rather than on the farm.193 Commerce crossed state
lines at will and the American economy began to nationalize. Americans were increasingly working for somebody else, often for a large and distant corporation.194
This “spectacular and sudden consolidation of economic power . . . worried many
ordinary people.”195 A major concern was that “not all segments of society benefitted
188

Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 430 (stating that federal jurisdiction “is subject to neither
limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the different States of
the Union”).
189
See Note, Effect of the Existence of an Adequate Remedy at Law in the State Courts on
Federal Equity Jurisdiction, 49 HARV. L. REV. 950, 952 (1936).
190
See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2.
191
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
192
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 85 (1998); TONY FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 100–02 (1979); Edward A. Purcell, Ex Parte
Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890–1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931,
936–37 (2009).
193
See FREYER, supra note 192, at 99–100.
194
Id. at 99 (“By about 1870, . . . the independent merchants who had controlled the
American economy from virtually the beginning gave way to a new industrial order dominated by large corporations.”).
195
ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 27 (1983).
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from the unbridled operation of the market economy.”196 The result was “[c]onvulsive
reform movements [that] swept across the American landscape from the 1890s to
1917.”197 Farmers fought corporate control of grain prices, industrial laborers demanded
safe working conditions, urban dwellers complained of filth and overcrowding in city
tenements, and small merchants deplored the monopoly power of corporate “trusts.”198
Local and state governments often answered the call for reform.199 They passed
laws setting tariffs, imposed new taxes, and required licenses for certain activities.200
The federal government also caught the reform spirit. Congress enacted new laws
to bust up monopolies201 and created a federal agency—the Interstate Commerce
Commission—to regulate all manner of business activity.202 Not all reforms arose
from government activity, however. By unionizing, laborers were often able to obtain improved wages and working conditions.203
Big business was, of course, dismayed by these so-called reforms. The problem
for business was two-fold. First, some reforms (such as rate caps) cut into corporate
profits directly.204 Second, the scattering of regulations throughout the nation made it
difficult to operate a national business.205 Businesses could perhaps live with taxes and
rate caps if they were nationally uniform, but a variety of these laws made interstate
commerce much more difficult.206
Business was not about to take these developments lying down. To fight back,
however, businesses had to choose the appropriate forum. State legislatures and courts
were unattractive fora because the political climate in reform-minded states was decidedly anti-business.207 Congress was little more attractive because it had already
shown its sympathy for reform and, in any event, had failed to address the regulatory
disuniformity that pervaded the country.208 The most attractive forum left was the
federal courts.209 The courts were well positioned for this task, having a “new tier of
196

ELY, supra note 192, at 85.
LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 195, at 1; id. at 29.
198
Id. at 1–2, 26–28; ELY, supra note 192, at 101.
199
ELY, supra note 192, at 85.
200
Id.; FREYER, supra note 192, at 102.
201
See Sherman Antitrust Act, §§ 1–2, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
202
LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 195, at 37–38.
203
Id. at 27.
204
See FREYER, supra note 192, at 102.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 107 (recording Judge Taft’s view that business preferred federal courts because of
the “deep-seated prejudice entertained against them by the local population”); Purcell, supra
note 192, at 937 (noting corporations’ “widespread and often intense suspicion of state courts”).
208
FREYER, supra note 192, at 112.
209
Id. (“This left the federal judiciary as the lone national institution capable of bringing
a degree of uniformity and unity to the law governing interstate corporate enterprise, a fact
clearly recognized by most leaders of big business.”); Purcell, supra note 192, at 937–38 (“A
deep faith in the integrity, independence, and capabilities of the national judiciary—fervent
197
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intermediate federal courts of appeals,”210 a grant of federal question jurisdiction,211 and
a constitutional amendment at their disposal that was specifically designed to limit state
power.212 They had also shown their sympathy for uniform national law by creating
a general federal law of contracts and, increasingly, torts.213
Big business thus flocked to the federal courts to defend itself. The federal courts
found themselves the arbiter of a massive national debate over the relationship between
business and government. These lawsuits “placed intense pressure on the Court to
honor two fundamental principles: first, that there were constitutional limits on governmental power and, second, that the courts would enforce those limits.”214 How was
the Court to honor these principles? Scholars have noted several doctrinal responses,215
but, for our purposes, the most relevant is the Court’s use of its injunctive power.
2. Perfect Opportunities
The collision between big business and big government put before the federal
courts a large number of cases that were perfectly fit for injunctive relief.216 As explained above, the federal courts’ willingness to issue injunctive relief depended in
large part on the adequacy of damages. Moreover, damages were considered per se inadequate in certain types of cases, particularly those involving: (1) prospective injury to property rights; (2) prospective injury to business interests; and (3) attempts
to escape inequitable suits at law.217 Not surprisingly, these were the exact sort of cases
among the comfortable classes, the legal profession’s eastern elite, and most of those who sat
on the federal bench—confirmed the wisdom of [resorting to federal courts].”).
210
Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 828; Purcell, supra note 192, at 937.
211
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; Purcell, supra note 192, at 933.
212
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ELY, supra note 192, at 82 (“Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 opened new possibilities for federal supervision of state legislation.”);
Purcell, supra note 192, at 933 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment provided a pivotal constitutional mandate that undergirded the transformation.”).
213
See FREYER, supra note 192, at 73–94 (explaining the legal and historical context behind
Swift v. Tyson). See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that certain
commercial disputes should be resolved by general common law, not the common law of a
particular state).
214
Purcell, supra note 192, at 936–37.
215
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 192, at 82–100 (describing developments in substantive due
process, takings law, Contract Clause suits, and federal tax power); id. at 938 (“Thus, in response to those varied considerations and pressures, the Court began in the 1890s to expand the
scope of national law, strengthen its own ability to supervise the nation’s legal system, and
alter the rules of federal jurisdiction to ensure that legally, socially, and economically important
cases could more easily be brought in the federal trial courts.”).
216
See Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 242–
43 (1936) (“About 1890, . . . numerous suits to enjoin the enforcement of state legislation
began to be brought in the federal courts, and were sanctioned by the Supreme Court.”).
217
See supra text accompanying notes 101–17.
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that businesses brought before the courts. Businesses did not just want damages for
a burdensome regulation; they wanted the regulation nullified. Roughly speaking, the
cases fell into four types: tax cases, rate cases, labor cases, and general regulatory
cases.218 In each instance, the federal courts issued injunctive relief freely—so freely
in fact that Congress, as we shall see in Part III, was eventually forced to put limits
on the courts’ powers.
Tax Cases. One common legislative tool of the era was the tax, whether it be on
income, property, or some sort of activity. Government taxation naturally instigated
lawsuits challenging the taxes.219 These suits were perfectly made for federal equity.
Often times, non-payment of the tax would result in a levy on property. Such a levy
“reduced [the] marketability of [the] property” and amounted to a classic business
injury.220 Other times, non-payment of the tax would put at risk a business license. This
risk included the “ultimate loss of livelihood” or at least a temporary “suspension of
business, [that is] not easily measured in dollars and cents.”221 Even where a tax debt
was not attached to any property, its enforcement was often accompanied by significant
additional penalties for nonpayment.222 The federal courts sometimes viewed these
penalties as so substantial that they, in effect, coerced a citizen into paying the tax instead of challenging the tax at law. Where such coercion existed, legal remedies were
inadequate and taxpayers could bring a suit in equity barring enforcement.223
218

See infra Part II.B.2. One might also create a category for certain types of corporate
litigation that frequently arose in equity. See, e.g., Note, The Case-Concept and Some Recent
Indirect Procedures for Attacking the Constitutionality of Federal Regulatory Statutes, 45
YALE L.J. 649, 649 (1935) (“Stockholders’ suits and cases framed in reorganization proceedings have been conspicuous weapons in recent phases of the constitutional battle between
business and the New Deal.”). In these suits, plaintiffs often challenged the constitutionality of
a particular law by alleging that, by following a particular law, a corporate officer was acting
ultra vires. To determine whether the officer’s action was ultra vires or not, the federal court
had to determine whether the law was constitutional or not. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). I do not include these suits here because they were not
traditional injunctive actions; rather, they were brought on the equity side of the court because
they typically involved some form of trust law. Trust law was distinctively equitable and had
no existence under the common law. See supra text accompanying notes 68–69.
219
See Purcell, supra note 192, at 945 (describing how, in the late nineteenth century, federal courts “began to scrutinize state taxation more thoroughly and more frequently, and federal
injunctions against state taxes grew in number and prominence”).
220
John E. Lockwood et al., The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 426, 434 (1930).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 433.
223
See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (“[I]n
view of the entire absence under the local law of any remedy enforceable by the plaintiff, if
the tax be paid and afterwards held invalid by the final decree, we are of opinion that the
application for an interlocutory injunction should have been granted . . . .”); Air-Way Elec.

36

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

Rate Cases. Another common regulatory tool of the era was rate setting. States
often established commissions to set rates for all sorts of public utilities, the most
prominent and contentious being railroads. Railroads often sought an injunction barring the rates from taking effect, and these suits were uncontroversial applications of
the federal courts’ injunctive powers.224 At a very minimum, equitable relief was appropriate because the rates “impose[d] a continuing duty sanctioned by a penalty.”225
Aside from the penalty, it would be virtually impossible to determine the effect of the
rates on the business. Would consumers purchase the same amount even at the higher
price? This was a complex economic question that equity had long considered more
appropriately resolved by injunction rather than damages.226
Equitable jurisdiction was also easily established by utilities who wished to escape
from inequitable legal actions. The famous case of Ex Parte Young227 is an excellent
example. In Young, a railroad challenged rates set by the state of Minnesota. The railroad sought an injunction barring Edward Young, the attorney general of the state, from
enforcing the rates.228 The state argued that equitable jurisdiction was inappropriate because the railroad had a remedy at law—namely the defense of unconstitutionality in
a state prosecution.229 This avenue of relief—though undeniably available—was ultimately unacceptable because the penalties for violating the statute were so steep that no
reasonable railroad employee would risk the penalty simply to challenge the statute.230
The remedy at law was thus inadequate and injunctive relief was appropriate.231
Labor Cases. Another significant type of case meriting federal injunctive relief was
the labor dispute. During this era, unions vigorously pressed employers for improvements in pay and working conditions. When these improvements were not forthcoming,
Appliance Co. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478 (1922); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.,
114 U.S. 311 (1884); Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U.S. 773 (1879).
224
See David E. Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities,
43 HARV. L. REV. 379, 398–400 (1930); Purcell, supra note 192, at 945 (“After 1890, the federal courts increasingly issued injunctions to block state regulatory actions and began using
due-process ideas to justify ‘rate-making’ injunctions and by the early twentieth century they
were hearing a wide variety of equitable suits challenging state efforts to establish or regulate
the rates charged by railroads and other public utilities.”).
225
Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 439.
226
See supra text accompanying notes 106–13, 176.
227
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
228
Id. at 129–30.
229
Id. at 163 (“It is further objected that there is a plain and adequate remedy at law open
to the complainants and that a court of equity, therefore, has no jurisdiction in such case.”).
230
Id. at 165 (“We do not say the company could not interpose this defense in an action to
recover penalties or upon the trial of an indictment . . . , but the facility of proving it in either
case falls so far below that which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely
possible.”) (citation omitted).
231
For explanation of this basis for the injunction in Ex Parte Young, see Harrison, supra
note 17.
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union bosses called for strikes. Employers then ran to the federal courts seeking an
injunction forcing workers to cease their strike. Like the other cases discussed above,
these cases too were well-fit for injunctive relief, most obviously because an interruption in business was a classic ground for the injunction.232 Thus, “[b]y the first decade
of the twentieth century the lower federal courts were enjoining more and more strikes,
boycotts, organizing campaigns and other labor-union activities, and their injunctions
grew in both the sweep of their prohibitions and the frequency of their use.”233 Indeed,
in the early twentieth century, then–Sixth Circuit Judge William Howard Taft admitted
that he “issued injunctions against labour unions, almost by the bushel.”234
In re Debs235 is perhaps the most famous labor injunction case. Debs involved a
federal court’s order that striking railroad employees return to work or else face termination by the railroad. The employees violated the injunction and their leader, Eugene
Debs, was prosecuted for contempt.236 Debs argued in the Supreme Court that his contempt charge was invalid because the trial court had no original power to issue the
injunction.237 The Court squarely disagreed, noting the value of equity in maintaining the supremacy of federal law:
No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the
States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. . . .
To impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may furnish or withhold,
would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which
might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible
with the language of the constitution.238
With regard to the assertion of judicial power, Debs later remarked “the ranks
were broken, and the strike was broken up . . . not by the Army, and not by any other
power, but simply and solely by the action of the United States courts in restraining
232

FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 48 n.5 (1930)
(“[T]he man carrying on a business has a certain sort of property right in the good will or the
successful conduct of that business.”).
233
Purcell, supra note 192, at 946.
234
Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft (Aug. 27, 1901), in H. TAFT,
RECOLLECTIONS OF FULL YEAR, at 223 (1914). For a discussion of Taft’s labor jurisprudence,
see Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing
and Boycotts, 1894–1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 70–76 (1989).
235
158 U.S. 564 (1895).
236
Id. at 572–73.
237
Id. at 577.
238
Id. at 578 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819)).
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us from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the employees.”239
After Debs, the injunction became the face of federal regulation.240
General Regulatory Cases. Aside from tax, rate, and labor cases, there are a number of cases that are best grouped under the label “general regulatory.” These cases
arose from governmental efforts to regulate professions, the manufacture or sale of
goods, and the use of land.241 No doubt other types of cases could be added. The common ground for injunctive relief in all of these cases is that the law “imposes a duty
of continued action or inaction” with regard to property or business interests.242 A state
might force a person to obtain a license in order to sell certain services,243 prohibit companies from using certain products,244 or forbid the use of land in some way.245 Such
continued interference with prospective business or property interests lied within the
heartland of the federal courts’ equity powers. A regulated entity, even if able to obtain relief in damages, would simply be forced to return to court again and again.246
Injunctions could also be justified by the regulated entity’s need to escape from
a coercive legal proceeding. Because there was usually no clear common law right to
engage in a particular trade, the validity of a regulation could only be tested by violating the regulation in question.247 Like tax regulations, these regulations typically
carried penalties for disobedience.248 These penalties, if substantial enough, were considered coercive and thus became a predicate to preemptive injunctive relief of the
sort employed in Ex Parte Young.249
***
Together, these four categories of equitable actions established beyond a doubt the
federal courts’ equitable power to issue injunctive relief in constitutional cases. As
239

U.S. STRIKE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE–JULY, 1894, S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-7 (3d Sess. 1895), reprinted in OWEN M. FISS & DOUGLAS RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS 20 (2d ed. 1984).
240
See Purcell, supra note 192, at 946.
241
Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 436.
242
Id.
243
See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110
(1922); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 345 (1917); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S.
339 (1917).
244
Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926).
245
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 184 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
246
See supra text accompanying notes 105, 169–74.
247
Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 437 (“Those [persons] embraced within the terms
of a statute of this type find themselves subjected to a burdensome limitation on their freedom
of conduct, existing and effective independently of any action at law to enforce it, as to the
validity of which no test may be had at law in the absence of a breach of its provisions.”).
248
Id.
249
See supra text accompanying notes 227–30.
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discussed in the next section, the courts’ equitable power would persist through the
remainder of the twentieth century, even with the enactment of statutes that plausibly
touched this power.
III. FEDERAL EQUITY IN MODERN TIMES
By 1930, the constitutional injunction was a well-established aspect of federal
judicial power. At that time, one commentator would write that “[w]herever the point
has been discussed, the courts have assumed that jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement
of unconstitutional statutes was clearly a part of the general equity powers, which
inevitably followed from the English practice of enjoining acts beyond the scope of
official authority.”250 In the decades after 1930, however, federal equity increasingly
had to take account of legislation affecting judicial review.
During that time, the Court acknowledged that Congress, if it so desired, could
deprive the federal courts of the authority to issue injunctions in constitutional cases.251
The hard question in the twentieth century would be how clearly Congress had to specify its desires. The level of clarity demanded of Congress in turn depended on the
degree to which the Court believed its power to issue injunctive relief sprang from its
federal question jurisdiction.252 If federal question jurisdiction includes a free-standing
power to issue injunctive relief, then Congress may only bar such relief if it speaks
with exceptional clarity.253 This requirement flows from the principle that Congress
must speak clearly when it attempts to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.254 In
contrast, if federal question jurisdiction does not bestow on federal courts the power
to issue injunctive relief, statutory prohibitions of the remedy may be much more
easily found.255
As noted in Part II, the federal courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries squarely believed that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction carried with it
the power to issue injunctive relief (provided the standard requirements for equitable
250

Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 431 n.23.
See, e.g., Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 327 (1938). This assumes that
there existed some other mechanism through which government could be forced to obey, on
average and over the long term, constitutional requirements. See generally John F. Preis,
Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009).
252
Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 1325 S. Ct. 2126, 2132–34 (2012).
253
See, e.g., id. at 2141 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (refusing to find that Congress deprived
the federal courts of the power to issue injunctive relief because it is “established practice for
th[e] Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights
safeguarded by the Constitution”) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
254
See, e.g., id.; Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2012) (requiring
explicit statement by Congress before finding federal courts lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331).
255
See, e.g., Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (holding that the power to issue an injunction was
divested if “Congress’ intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was fairly discernible in
the statutory scheme”) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994)).
251
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relief were met).256 The survival of the courts’ implied equitable power during the twentieth century therefore would turn on whether that belief persisted or waned. Below,
I explain how the federal courts have largely retained that belief, and why they are
justified in doing so. I do so by examining the Court’s approach to several important
legislative enactments, including several anti-injunction statutes, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a revision to the Rules of Decision Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
Administrative Procedure Act.
Before beginning this discussion, one matter deserves attention. The reader will
note that this Part contains no discussion of the adequate remedy rule. In the nineteenth century, this rule was an often-noted aspect of the Court’s equity jurisprudence
though, as noted above, its effect was relatively minor.257 By the mid-twentieth century, however, the rule had faded almost entirely from view, especially in the realm
of constitutional enforcement. In the definitive study of the subject, Professor Douglas
Laycock documented how courts in the twentieth century came to see constitutional
rights as intangible, something that can “never [be] bought or sold in any market.”258
“This is why injunctions are the standard remedy in civil rights . . . litigation,” Laycock
writes.259 “[A] damage award” he continues, can never “replace the right to vote, equal
representation, an adequate hearing, integrated public facilities, minimally adequate
treatment in a state prison, free speech, religious liberty, education, freedom from
employment discrimination, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, or any
similar civil or political right.”260 Thus, even though the adequate remedy rule has
never been affirmatively abrogated, it has ceased to play a meaningful role in the
federal courts’ equitable jurisprudence.
A. Anti-Injunction Statutes
Although federal equity was a well-established aspect of constitutional enforcement at the turn of the twentieth century, it was not necessarily popular. Business was
obviously happy to have an ally in its fight against regulation, but state and local
governments were furious at federal intervention in local matters, as were those whom
these governments had been attempting to protect.261 Complaints of excessive judicial interference found their way to Congress and, in the 1930s, Congress barred federal injunctive relief in three of the types of cases discussed above (rate, tax, and labor
cases).262 In forbidding injunctions in certain cases, however, Congress only confirmed
the courts’ freestanding authority to issue injunctive relief without prior authorization.
256

See supra text accompanying note 186.
See supra Parts II.A.3.a–b.
258
LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 41.
259
Id.
260
Id. (citations omitted).
261
See Lockwood, supra note 220, at 426–27.
262
See Rate Injunction Act, Pub. L . No. 105-175, ch. 283, § 1, 48 Stat. 775 (1934) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006)); Tax Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 75-332, ch. 726,
257
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The first of the three statutes addressed the courts’ perceived excesses in labor
injunctions. Enacted in 1932, the law stated that “no court of the United States, . . .
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”263 The second, which came
in 1934, was enacted in response to the federal courts “interfere[nce] wholesale with
public utility rate orders.”264 In that statute, Congress ordered that “no district court
shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the enforcement . . .
of an administrative board or commission of a State, or any rate-making body of any
political subdivision . . . .”265 Finally, in 1937, Congress responded to complaints that
the federal courts were “free and easy with injunctions” in tax cases.266 The result was
a statute stating that “no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax . . . of any State . . . .”267
Two observations about these statutes are important. First, it is notable that, in
each instance, Congress conceived of the matter as one of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the federal courts’ view that their equitable power springs from Congress’s
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the court (normally, diversity or federal question
jurisdiction).268 The simple use of the term “jurisdiction” is not definitive, for Congress
§ 1, 50 Stat. 738 (1937) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)); Norris-LaGuardia
Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101–04 (2006)).
263
§ 1, 47 Stat. at 70.
264
England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 431 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
265
§ 1, 48 Stat. at 775.
266
England, 375 U.S. at 431 (Douglas, J., concurring). States in this era were in dire need
of funds and corporations often attempted to delay or even cancel their tax burdens by heading
to federal court. A Senate report endorsing a ban on injunctions put it thusly:
The existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax-injunction
suits against State officers makes it possible for foreign corporations doing
business in such States to withhold from them and their governmental
subdivisions, taxes in such vast amounts and for such long periods of
time as to seriously disrupt State and county finances. The pressing needs
of these States for this tax money is so great that in many instances they
have been compelled to compromise these suits, as a result of which
substantial portions of the tax have been lost to the States without a
judicial examination into the real merits of the controversy.
S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 2 (1937); see also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment
and Collection of State Taxes, 59 HARV. L. REV. 780, 783 (1946) (noting that federal courts
were “readily amenable to persuasion that the state remedy was inadequate,” thus laying the
groundwork for a federal injunction).
267
§ 1, 50 Stat. at 738. See generally Frederick C. Lowinger, Comment, The Tax Injunction
Act and Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 736 (1979) (detailing the effects of the
Tax Injunction Act).
268
See supra text accompanying note 131.
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has not always been precise in its use of the word “jurisdiction.”269 Still, it lends significant support to the view that the power to issue injunctive relief upon a violation
of federal law inhered in the courts’ general jurisdictional grants.
The second—and more important—observation is that, by divesting federal courts
of the power to issue injunctions in specific types of cases, Congress implicitly confirmed that the courts enjoyed a freestanding authority to issue injunctive relief. If
Congress was barring injunctive relief, the power to issue such relief in a constitutional
case must have preexisted the statutes and would thus presumably remain available in
cases outside their scope.
Mid-century scholarship and case law confirm this understanding. In 1948, Herbert
Wechsler addressed the federal courts’ remedial power in a significant paper.270 He observed first that “federal substantive law [often] prescribes rights and duties without
also providing for their [manner of] vindication.”271 The absence of instructions as to
vindication in turn invites inquiry into whether “Congress meant to relegate [enforcement to] state legal systems or assumed, on the contrary, that [remedies] would come
from interstitial legislation of the federal courts . . . .”272 Wechsler explained that the
answer was “uncertain[ ]” when it came to damages actions.273 With regard to suits
for injunctive relief, however, the answer was clear: “[T]he presumption is in favor
of the federal judiciary in cases where the remedy invoked is equitable.”274
Professor Wechsler’s account is echoed by Louis Jaffe’s work about a decade
later.275 Speaking of the federal courts’ power to issue relief, Jaffe explained,
“Congress . . . may indeed exclude judicial review. But judicial review is the rule.
It rests on the congressional grant of general jurisdiction to the Article III courts.”276
Another decade later, other scholars were repeating the same view.277
269

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998) (noting
that even a statutory provision that uses the word “jurisdiction” may not relate to “subjectmatter jurisdiction”).
270
Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216 (1948).
271
Id. at 241.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1957).
276
Id. at 432.
277
See, e.g., Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962 and “Nonstatutory” Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 308, 322–23 (1967) (“More often, the nonstatutory review action [i.e., an action for
injunctive relief not specifically authorized by statute] is based upon a jurisdictional section
of title 28 of the United States Code, such as section 1331, the general ‘federal question’ jurisdictional grant . . . .”); Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 395 (1970) (explaining that injunctive relief
is presumptively available if federal question jurisdiction exists); Alfred Hill, Constitutional
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Case law during this era adopted the same approach. In Mulford v. Smith,278 for
example, the Court was asked to enjoin federal officers from imposing penalties on the
sale of tobacco under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.279 In assessing whether the
district court had the power to issue injunctive relief, the Court first determined that
Congress had given district courts subject matter jurisdiction over “all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce.”280 Having found a general basis
for subject matter jurisdiction, the Court then inquired whether Congress, by some more
particular statute, had withdrawn the power to issue relief.281 The Court addressed one
possible bar to relief, but quickly dismissed it because it “applie[d] only to a suit to restrain assessment or collection of a tax.”282 Having answered these two questions, the
Court held that it had the authority to issue injunctive relief (provided that no adequate
alternative existed).283 Nowhere in Mulford did the Court look for, much less demand,
explicit authorization from Congress that the Agricultural Adjustment Act could be
enforced through injunction.
Numerous other cases fit the Mulford model.284 When landmark injunctive actions
like Brown v. Board of Education285 and Cooper v. Aaron286 came along in the 1950s,
it was a foregone conclusion that the federal courts could enjoin unconstitutional action
without a specific statutory authorization.287 These cases contained no discussion at
Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (1969) (“Where the conduct is of a kind that would
not be the basis of a damage action at common law, considered apart from the statutory or
constitutional provision that has been violated, the officer is undoubtedly subject to remedies
of an equitable nature . . . .”).
278
307 U.S. 38 (1939).
279
Id. at 45.
280
Id. at 46 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
281
Id. at 46.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 46–47 (finding that “no action at law would be adequate to redress the damage . . .
inflicted”).
284
See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958) (holding that jurisdiction to issue
injunctive relief was obtained under “statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction”)
(quoting Switchmen’s Union v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943)); Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947) (holding that federal
courts have statutory authority to issue injunctions against bank boards in certain cases); Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290, 310 (1944) (holding that federal courts have authorization
to issue injunctions under an agriculture statute); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946) (“[I]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts
to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to do.”); Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (“When Congress leaves to the federal courts the
formulation of remedial details, it can hardly expect them to break with historic principles
of equity in the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights.”).
285
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
286
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
287
The cause of action that would be used today, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not recognized
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all of federal judicial power to enjoin unconstitutional conduct. This is not to say that
injunctive relief was uncontroversial in the latter half of the twentieth century. It certainly was. The complaints of this era, however, were aimed at structural reform injunctions that affirmatively commanded various reforms, not injunctions that merely
prohibited unconstitutional action.288 The debate, in other words, was about the reach
of the courts’ equitable prescriptions, not their historical power to imply injunctive
causes of action.
B. The Federal Rules
Another major legislative event of the twentieth century was the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.289 Before that moment, lawsuits in the federal
courts were litigated according to an amalgam of state and federal laws, some statutory
and some judicially created. The Federal Rules changed this. The Rules replaced the
many different legal and equitable actions with “one form of action,” a so-called “civil
action.”290 No longer would plaintiffs rely on a writ of trespass, or seek a writ of ejectment. The law underlying these actions was retained, but the formalities were dispensed
with. The goal of the Rules was to “take off all the labels, abolish all the different forms
of actions, and thus clear the way for the joinder of legal with equitable claims.”291
By their title alone, the Federal Rules declared that certain matters were distinctly
procedural and others, by having been excluded from the Federal Rules’ scope, were
non-procedural. What was the cause of action then, procedural or non-procedural?
Or, put differently, did the Federal Rules modify the courts’ concept of the “cause of
action?” The answer, it turns out, depends on whether the suit was traditionally legal
or equitable. Prior to the Federal Rules’ enactment, legal claims filed in federal court
were, as explained in Part II, controlled by state writs.292 These writs were often allencompassing, dictating matters that today would be classified as procedural, substantive, and remedial.293 When the rules took effect, the state procedural law was displaced
by a single “civil action,” but other law was left intact.294 This bred confusion, for the
until 1961. See infra Part III.D.1. Thus, these suits and most other civil rights actions were
brought using implied injunctive actions.
288
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (school finance); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prison conditions); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (school busing).
289
FED. R. CIV. P.
290
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
291
ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. OCTOBER 6, 7, 8, 1938
AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY OCTOBER 17, 18, 19, 1938 275 (Edward H.
Hammond ed., 1938).
292
See supra text accompanying notes 139–41.
293
See supra text accompanying notes 49, 74–76.
294
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
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writ (or equivalent state law device) had long been the source of the plaintiff’s “cause
of action.”295
If federal procedure now controlled the writ, from where did the plaintiff’s cause
originate? The new Federal Rules obviously did not displace state tort law itself, but
they did seem to displace the routine implements of tort law, such as the writ of trespass. Professor Anthony Bellia has documented this confusion in detail and shown
how our modern understanding of the cause of action has ignored these nuances.296
Professor Bellia’s account focuses mostly on legal, rather than equitable, actions.
The distinction is crucial, however. Because equity was controlled by federal law all
along, the new Federal Rules did not disrupt the equitable cause of action in a similar
way. To be sure, the Federal Rules clearly applied to equitable suits and those actions
were accordingly pleaded differently after 1938. But mediating the relationship between two different species of federal law (the Federal Rules and equitable common
law) was far different than mediating the relationship between state and federal law.
The abolition of state law forms of action created a vacuum in federal damages practice and forced federal courts to figure out the proper origin of the damages cause of
action—whether it be part of the new Federal Rules themselves or as part of the substantive law.297 No such vacuum was created in equity. Federal courts simply assumed
that their preexisting equitable authority was unaffected by the new Federal Rules. The
cases discussed just above in Part III.A—all post-1938—illustrate this well.298
Other cases address the issue more directly. As one federal judge wrote soon after
rules were enacted, “[t]he distinction between Law and Equity, abolished by the new
rules, is a distinction in procedure and not a distinction between remedies.”299 Another
judge put it this way:
While the rules effect a unity of procedure they do not effect a
merger of remedies. Legal and equitable remedies, while they may
be administered in the same proceeding, must be administered
295
See supra text accompanying notes 48–49; see also Bellia, supra note 17, at 783 (“At
the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of action was
generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in equity
afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance.”).
296
Bellia, supra note 17, at 850–51 (“It was only after . . . the establishment of one ‘civil
action’ [in the Federal Rules] that the question would arise: Do federal courts have authority
to create or infer remedies for federal statutory violations? Whatever the practice of English and
state courts had been in this regard, it does not establish that the federal constitutional structure
contemplated the same practice in federal courts.”).
297
Id. at 846–48 (arguing that in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action, “[s]ome
courts applied substantive principles that evolved from the forms of action to civil actions
brought under a code. . . . [While other courts found that] the new procedural code, which
displaced the forms of action, supplied a remedy”).
298
See supra notes 278–88 and accompanying text.
299
Bellvance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1939).

46

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

separately as heretofore. It is not intended that the remedies shall
be either jointly or interchangeably administered at the will or demand of the litigants. The rights and remedies of the respective
parties remain unaffected.300
Numerous other sources confirm this account.301 Thus, even though the Federal Rules
dramatically changed federal procedure, and unsettled legal causes of action, they did
not substantially affect the federal courts’ practice of issuing injunctive relief.
C. Revision of the Rules of Decision Act
In 1948, Congress amended the Rules of Decision Act—a statute dating back to
the Founding and one we have discussed already.302 Recall that when Congress created
the federal courts and bestowed them with diversity jurisdiction, it had to instruct them
on what law to apply in those cases.303 Congress ordered the courts to apply “the laws
of the several states . . . as [the] rules of decision in trials at common law.”304 By its
terms, the statute only addressed “trials at common law”; where federal courts were
acting in equity, they were free to create their own “common law of chancery.”305 In
this way, law and equity in the federal courts developed on different tracks.306
In 1948, this changed. As part of a major revision of the Judicial Code, Congress
ordered the federal courts to follow “[t]he laws of the several states . . . as [the] rules
300

Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 1 F.R.D. 713, 715 (D.N.J. 1941).
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) (“Notwithstanding
the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of
Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 39 F.
Supp. 761, 761–63 (D. Ala. 1941) (similar), rev’d on other grounds, Barnett v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.2d 712 (1941); Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321, 323 (D. Pa.
1940) (similar); Grauman v. City Co. of N.Y., 31 F. Supp. 172, 173–74 (S.D.N.Y 1939)
(similar); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; CIVIL 3D § 1043
(2002) (“The rules have not abrogated the distinction between equitable and legal remedies.
Only the procedural distinctions have been abolished.”); Armistead Dobie, The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 262 (1939) (“Of course, [the new Rules are] applicable only to procedure. It is still quite proper to speak of equitable rights, equitable remedies
and equitable titles . . . .”). For an account of the Federal Rules’ lack of effect on federal
equity, see Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New
Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130 (1943).
302
See supra notes 139–47 and accompanying text.
303
Id.
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See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
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Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 563 (1852);
see also Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) (directing federal courts
to adjudicate equitable actions “according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to
courts of equity . . . as contradistinguished from courts of common law”).
306
See supra text accompanying notes 145–66.
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of decision in civil actions,”307 rather than just at “trials at common law.”308 This change
gave rise to the inference that Congress took from the courts their power to create a
“common law of chancery,” thus disapproving the courts’ power to imply injunctive
relief in constitutional cases.
This inference does not carry the day, however. The Rules of Decision Act, both
at the beginning and after the 1948 amendment, was aimed at diversity cases.309 The
Act explicitly accommodated a different approach for federal question suits, however.
In these actions, federal courts were exempted from following state law “where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress” provided a rule of
decision.310 The effect of the 1948 Act depends, therefore, on whether an equitable action was brought under a court’s diversity or federal question jurisdiction. In diversity
cases, federal courts were obliged to follow the state equity law. In federal question
cases (which would include constitutional challenges), however, the court was free to
apply the traditional rules of equity it had developed throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth century.
This conclusion is supported by the committee report from the 1948 Act itself.
The committee explained that the amendment constituted merely a “change[ ] . . . in
phraseology.”311 The Act endeavored to “clarify the meaning of the Rules of Decision
Act in light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”312 The Federal Rules, as will be
recalled, merged legal and equitable pleading rules in 1938.313 Under the Rules, there
would be a single code of pleading for all “civil action[s].”314 Having recast all federal
cases as civil actions, Congress returned to the Rules of Decision Act a decade later
to update that statute. The committee report further notes that the Rules of Decision
Act, even before the 1948 Amendment, “has been held to apply to suits in equity.”315
The committee is undoubtedly referring here to Guaranty Trust v. York,316 a diversity
case in which the Court held that original Rules of Decision Act “was equally applicable to equity suits.”317
Further support for this interpretation of the 1948 Act comes from Herbert
Wechsler’s contemporaneous article, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
307

Judicial Code and Judiciary Revision Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 1652, 62 Stat. 869, 944
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948)) (emphasis added).
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Judicial Code.318 Professor Wechsler was one of the most prominent jurisdiction
scholars of the era and his view carries considerable weight. He saw the statute as
merely directing federal courts to follow state equity law in diversity cases.319 The Act
did not address, except by implication, the power of federal courts to imply causes
of action where “federal substantive law” creates the rights in question.320 In those
situations, federal courts would be left to discern whether Congress expected the courts
to refer to state law for the cause of action, or create one of its own. Wechsler observed
that “it seems plain now that the presumption” is that the federal courts may create a
cause of action on their own “where the remedy invoked is equitable.”321
Finally, this interpretation is also supported by the Supreme Court’s unbroken
practice of implying injunctive relief before and after the 1948 amendment.322 Thus,
the 1948 revision to the Rules of Decision Act did not modify the federal courts’
standing power to imply suits for injunctive relief to enforce the Constitution.
D. § 1983 and the Administrative Procedure Act
In the mid-twentieth century, two statutes rose to the fore as tools for judicial
review—one against state officials323 and one against federal officials.324 Neither
statute, however, displaced the federal courts’ general power to imply injunctive relief in constitutional cases.
1. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action, in law or equity, to any person
“depriv[ed] [by a state official] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
318

See Wechsler, supra note 270.
Id. at 241 (“In so far as rights and duties have not been created by federal law they must,
if they exist at all, derive their being from state sources. The question when creation of such
rights or duties is committed to the action of the federal judiciary is unaffected by the [1948 Act],
which retains the substance of the vital qualifying language: state laws govern . . . ‘except where
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide.’”).
320
Id.
321
Id. Though finding this rule “plain,” Wechsler nonetheless regretted that the 1948 Act
did not make it explicit. He stated that the issue should not
be left merely to an implication . . . . There should . . . be a companion
section . . . provid[ing] that for enforcement of all federal rights and
duties the federal courts are authorized to grant all remedies afforded
by the principles of law, unless an Act of Congress otherwise requires
or provides. This would eliminate all doubt that the courts of the United
States administer a wholly federal jurisprudence in so far as they are
dealing with the remedial consequences of the federal law . . . .
Id.
322
See supra notes 278–87 and accompanying text.
323
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
324
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006)).
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the Constitution . . . .”325 The statute rose to prominence in the mid-1960s, but its roots
extend much further back in time. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the newly freed
blacks living in the South found themselves without any meaningful legal protection.326
Racist organizations were numerous and unchecked by state officials. Lynchings and
other abuses were a common occurrence. Dismayed by this lawlessness, Congress
enacted the Ku Klux Act in 1871.327 In the law, Congress created two types of enforcement powers. First, federal prosecutors were given the power to criminally prosecute
state officials who violated federal constitutional rights.328 Second, individual citizens
were given a cause of action—whether in law or equity—to challenge constitutional
violations visited upon them by state officials.329
In the years after the law’s enactment, federal prosecutors used the statute to
prosecute rogue state officials.330 Individual citizens, however, never made use of the
private cause of action.331 The reasons for this are unclear.332 What is clear is that the
statute laid dormant until a different civil rights era—the 1960s. In 1961, a man by the
name of James Monroe sued several Chicago police officers for damages caused by
their unlawful search and seizure.333 He relied upon the until-then ignored § 1983. In
the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, the Court held that the statute did in fact provide Monroe with a cause of action for damages.334
The text of § 1983 clearly extends a cause of action for “an action at law [or a] suit
in equity . . . .”335 Thus, to the extent that Monroe holds that § 1983 provides a cause
of action for damages, it would certainly hold that the statute does the same for equitable relief. After 1961, therefore, the federal courts might have had little need for the
implied cause of action in suits against state officers. Why imply a cause of action when
one has been explicitly provided? And moreover, if one has been explicitly provided
for certain situations, doesn’t that impliedly divest the federal courts of authority to
imply relief in other situations?
The problem with this logic is that the implied equitable action grew up long before § 1983 was enacted and became an entrenched constitutional remedy long before
§ 1983 was discovered in 1961. The key question in discerning the effect of a statute
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on the implied equitable action is whether Congress, by providing one cause of action,
intended to rescind all others. Were the Court to hold today that Congress meant to bar
implied causes of action in 1871, the Court would somehow have to explain how the
implied injunctive action remained a routine tool of constitutional enforcement during
the ensuing ninety years.
Not only that, but the Court would have to explain its approach to the implied
injunctive action since 1961. Since that time, § 1983 has served as an avenue for
injunctive relief quite often. But not every case falls within the parameters of the
statute.336 In those instances, the Court has not questioned its inherent power to issue
injunctive relief. Take the case of Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission
of Maryland,337 in which Verizon sought an injunction barring a Maryland commission
from issuing an order that, in Verizon’s view, violated the Federal Communications
Act.338 One issue in the case was whether Verizon could even maintain the suit. Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia approved the cause of action simply:
Verizon seeks relief from the Commission’s order on the ground
that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail,
and its claim thus presents a federal question which the federal
courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.339
Nowhere in Verizon did the Court consider whether the affirmative grant of relief
through § 1983 was essential to the plaintiff’s suit. Indeed, the Court’s analysis was
quite similar to that employed in the wake of the anti-injunction statutes discussed
above. The Court considered § 1331 the ordinary “mechanism” for “district-court
review” and thus looked to whether any provision of the Telecommunications Act impliedly stripped jurisdiction from the courts.340 Interpreting the statute, the Court found
its language “not enough to eliminate jurisdiction under § 1331.”341 Thus, federal question jurisdiction remained and the Court was free to issue injunctive relief.
In sum, § 1983 does not impliedly divest the federal courts of their inherent power
to issue injunctive relief. This conclusion fits the statute’s nineteenth-century origin
and the Court’s numerous cases implying injunctive relief without regard to § 1983.
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2. Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act, or APA, provides a cause of action to persons
“seeking relief other than money damages” for a “legal wrong [caused by federal]
agency action.”342 The Act was adopted in 1946, well after the federal courts had come
to view § 1331 as an implied grant of power to enjoin unconstitutional conduct.343
Unlike § 1983, therefore, it is easier to read the APA as replacing the Court’s implied
cause of action jurisprudence regarding federal officials and, implicitly, barring all
causes of action that fall outside its purview.344
That interpretation has not prevailed, however, and properly so. Where a constitutional action against a federal official falls outside the scope of the APA’s cause of
action, plaintiffs may typically resort to review on a so-called “nonstatutory” basis.345
Evidence in favor of this view shows up soon after the passage of the APA. In 1947,
the U.S. Attorney General issued the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act.346 The manual referred to the APA not as a new regime of judicial review, but as “a general restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in
many statutes and judicial decisions.”347 The two most influential commentators of the
era—Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis—took a similar view of the statute.348 And
so has the Supreme Court. Take for example, Leedom v. Kyne,349 an important postAPA case. In Kyne, a union leader sought a ruling by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) that the union was entitled to certain collective bargaining rights.350
The NLRB ruled against the plaintiff, who then sought review in a federal district court,
and later, in the Supreme Court. The NLRB’s decision was not reviewable under the
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APA because it did not amount to final agency action. Yet the Court reviewed the suit
anyway, citing its authority under the “statutory provisions governing [its] general
jurisdiction.”351 This approach is consistent with that taken by the Court long before the
APA was enacted,352 and reflects the widely held view that the APA was “a general restatement” of preexisting rules of judicial power, not a new regime of judicial review.353
Years later, the Court continued to affirm the principle laid down in Kyne. “Kyne
stands for the familiar proposition,” the Court explained in 1991, “that ‘only upon a
showing of “clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary legislative intent should the
courts restrict access to judicial review.’”354 Just the next year, the Court applied the
“familiar proposition” in Franklin v. Massachusetts,355 a case testing the constitutionality of the reapportionment of Massachusetts’ seats in the House of Representatives.
The Court first considered whether the reapportionment decision was reviewable under
the APA.356 Finding that the decision did not constitute “final agency action” and that
the “President [was] not an agency” under the APA, the Court denied review on this
basis.357 If the APA displaced all other causes of action, this should have been the end
of the case. It was not, however. The Court went on: “Although the reapportionment
determination is not subject to review under the standards of the APA, that does not dispose of appellees’ constitutional claims.”358 The Court then went on to decide the case
“on the merits.”359 Franklin thus illustrates that the APA is not the exclusive cause of
action for injunctive relief; judicially implied injunctive relief remains available.360
Thus, even though the APA created an explicit cause of action against federal
officers, the federal courts have not interpreted the statute as precluding other causes
of action, and appropriately so. As one commentator summarized it, “There is, in fact,
general judicial and scholarly agreement that nonstatutory review was never eliminated
and may still be used today. It may be used in cases where the APA fails to provide
a plaintiff with a remedy.”361
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***
In sum, legislation throughout the twentieth century did not withdraw the federal
courts’ longstanding power to create injunctive actions. Congress, to be sure, has the
power to enact such legislation. To date, however, it has declined to take such a significant step. The federal courts thus retain today a power they possessed at the Founding:
the power to imply injunctive relief in constitutional cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is not obliged to live in the past, but it is free to do so if it
pleases. In the realm of equity, the Supreme Court has long chosen this path—
referring repeatedly to historical practice in resolving questions of judicial power. This
Article has shown that the federal courts have long enjoyed the power to enforce the
Constitution by creating injunctive actions, even where Congress has not specifically
authorized the practice. If the Court—as it has recently hinted—desires to withhold
injunctive relief in such instances, it must reckon this approach with centuries of past
practices. Requiring congressional authorization may or may not be good policy. It
is not, however, faithful to existing law.

